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ABSTRACT

In Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010) and Federal Election
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (2007), the Supreme Court dramatically reduced the
ability of Congress to regulate campaign finance activities of corporations and others active in
elections. Many of the same activities are still subject to restrictions imposed by the Internal
Revenue Code, and the tax code’s restrictions are considerably more intrusive than what is
permitted under campaign finance law. For example, section 501(c)(3) charitable organizations
are not permitted to engage in any campaign activity, and the definition of campaign activity for
tax code purposes is much broader than it is for campaign finance law purposes. Many nonprofit
organizations involved in election-related activities are thus subject to two different and sometimes
conflicting legal standards regulating their election-related activities.
This Article analyzes recent campaign finance decisions that have enlarged the area of
protected political speech to determine how, if at all, the Roberts Court’s campaign finance
jurisprudence is likely to alter existing tax law jurisprudence in the area of election activity. For
the most part, tax law jurisprudence has developed independently of other areas of First
Amendment law. Based upon an analysis of the distinctive tax law constitutional doctrines, the
Article concludes that the tax law prohibition against section 501(c)(3) charities engaging in
campaigns is likely to withstand constitutional challenges seeking to import the campaign finance
First Amendment standard to invalidate the tax law restrictions. The Article also concludes that
an overbreadth challenge is likely to fail. There is some possibility that the tax law prohibition is
vulnerable to constitutional attack under traditional doctrines of vagueness because the terms of
the tax law provisions, as these have been elaborated to date, are not sufficiently precise. However,
what will transpire in the coming years is more likely to be a function of the degree of activism of
the Roberts Court than an application of existing constitutional jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
Since John G. Roberts became Chief Justice, the Supreme Court
1
has repeatedly been accused of judicial activism. Among other rea1



See Press Release, U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Senate Judiciary Meeting on the
Nomination of Solicitor General Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court (Jul. 20, 2010), available at http://whitehouse.senate.gov/newsroom/press/
release/?id=20C66640-20C3-4B3E-8959-AA302211486F (arguing that the Roberts Court’s
numerous 5-4 decisions are evidence of judicial activism because they reflect the Court’s
unwillingness to narrow its holdings to achieve broader consensus); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Conservatives Embrace Judicial Activism in Campaign Finance Ruling, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2010, at A29 (arguing that conservative jutices on the Roberts Court “are happy
to be activists when it serves their ideological agenda”); Simon Lazarus, The Most Activist
Court: How progressives should think about and respond to the assaults of the Roberts Court, AMER.
PROSPECT (June 29, 2007), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_most_
activist_court (characterizing the Roberts Court as an “activist enterprise”); Dan Rad-
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sons, the Roberts Court has expressly overturned earlier decisions in
2
numerous areas of the law, and it has arguably overturned earlier
3
decisions in numerous other cases.

2

3



macher, Judicial Activism for Me, Not for Thee, ROANOKE TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at 1 (“The
Roberts Court, despite the chief justice’s [sic] promises to respect precedent, has not
shied away from the type of judicial activism conservatives normally decry.”); Jeffrey Rosen, Court Approval, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 23, 2007, at 9, 12 (“For more than 50 years,
conservatives have insisted that judges should defer to legislatures and let citizens resolve
their disputes politically. But, at the very moment they consolidated their majority, they
have abandoned this principle and embraced the activism they once deplored.”); Jeffrey
Toobin, Activism v. Restraint, THE NEW YORKER, May 24, 2010, at 19 (“Chief Justice John G.
Roberts, Jr., and his conservative fellow-Justices, like their ideological kinsmen in the nineteen-thirties, are engaging in what’s known as judicial activism.”). There is no authoritative definition of the term “judicial activism,” and even those who have defined it would
probably admit that much judicial activism is in the eye of the beholder. As a general
rule of thumb, a court that frequently (by some standard) strikes down legislation or
overturns judicial precedent is likely to be considered activist, especially if it is seen as motivated by its own policy preferences rather than a careful consideration of established
doctrines. See Frank B. Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, The Scientific Study of Judicial Activism, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1752, 1754 (2007) (discussing a “social scientific measure of judicial
activism that allows comparisons across courts and across Justices”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401,
1403–04 (2002) (arguing that the definition of what constitutes “activism” should reflect
the view that “unless the application of the Constitution or statute is so clear that it has
the traditional qualities of law rather than political or moral philosophy, a judge should
let democracy prevail”) (emphasis in original); Eric J. Segall, Reconceptualizing Judicial Activism as Judicial Responsibility: A Tale of Two Justice Kennedys, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 709, 711–712
(2009) (“Instead of the current and relentless discussion of judicial activism . . . we should
focus more on . . . judicial responsibility. The Court ought to write its decisions consistently with professional standards, adhere to basic rule of law principles, and, perhaps,
engage in principled decision making while reaching results the public can at least tolerate.”); Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,”, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1443–44 (2004) (exploring the history of the concept of judicial activism and identifying five modern meanings of judicial activism).
See e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (overturning two Supreme
Court precedents and a federal statute enacted in 1947); Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct.
808, 813 (2009) (overturning the mandatory two-step process for courts to judge police
officers’ qualified immunity first established in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001));
Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009) (overturning Michigan v. Jackson, 475
U.S. 625 (1986)); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907
(2007) (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911),
which held that minimum retail price agreements were per se illegal); Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (overruling Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers,
Inc., 371 U.S. 215 (1962) and Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384 (1964) (per curiam) “to the
extent they purport to authorize an exception to a jurisdictional rule”).
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1476–77 (2009) (overruling, according to the
dissent written by Justice Souter, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)); Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 576–77 (2007) (overruling, according to the dissent
written by Justice Stevens, the literal reading of the sufficiency standard stated in Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 551 U.S. 701, 823–37 (2007) (overruling, according to the dissent written by Justice
Breyer, established precedents that distinguish the application of strict scrutiny in racial
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Whether the Roberts Court’s decisions are actually more activist
than those of earlier Supreme Courts is a topic that warrants serious
4
debate. In the area of political speech, however, the record is clear
that the Court does not feel bound to defer to Congressional judgments and judicial precedents. Citizens United v. Federal Election Com-

4

discrimination challenges involving exclusive as against inclusive race-conscious policies);
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. 449, 483–84, 504 (2007) (overruling, according to seven of the Justices, one of the core holdings of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
(2003)); see also infra note 135 and accompanying text. Several commentators have also
argued that the Roberts Court has tacitly or stealthily overruled precedents. See, e.g., Civil
Rights Under Fire: Recent Supreme Court Decisions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 83 (2009)
(testimony of Dahlia Lithwick, Senior Editor, Slate Magazine) (“I think it is no longer a
matter of any real scholarly dispute that the current U.S. Supreme Court has worked hard
in some ways to roll back what some conservatives have seen as the worst excesses of the
Warren court era . . . . But I want to point out that more frequently it happens very undramatically in a series of feints and legal pirouettes . . . .”); Barry Friedman, The Wages of
Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (2010)
(discussing why the Court “would choose to overrule by stealth, rather than overtly, [and]
the effects of [it] choosing to do so”); Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts
Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1065
(2008) (arguing that “Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have made . . . deregulatory
moves without expressly overturning existing precedent”); ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, THE
ROBERTS COURT’S RECORD OF OVERREACHING, 2–3 (2010), http://www.afj.org/connectwith-the-issues/the-corporate-court/roberts-court-overreach-memo.pdf (last visited Mar.
27, 2011) (arguing that the Roberts Court has overstepped its boundaries by “deciding to
hear cases about legal issues which do not currently warrant Supreme Court review,”
“answering questions not presented to the Court,” and “deciding factual issues more
properly reviewed and decided by lower courts”); see also Laura Krugman Ray, The Style of
a Skeptic: The Opinions of Chief Justice Roberts, 83 IND. L.J. 997, 1033 (2008) (noting U.S.
Supreme Court decisions that “tend[] to undermine, though not expressly overrule,
Court precedents”); Nina Totenberg, The Roberts Court and the Role of Precedent, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (July 3, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1168820
(“Although [Justices] Roberts and Alito both promised at their confirmation hearings to
honor precedent whenever possible, in their first full term together, they effectively reversed a number of key precedents.”).
It is possible, however, that the Court has acquired this reputation because of the contrast
between the Chief Justice’s claim, during his nomination hearings, that he would judge as
an umpire calling balls and strikes, not as a legislator, and the perception of some that he
has been especially aggressive in his rulings. See Editorial, The Court’s Aggressive Term, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 5, 2010, at A16 (“In the most recent term, even more than in earlier years, the
Roberts court [sic] demonstrated its determination to act aggressively to undo aspects of
law it found wanting, no matter the cost.”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John
G. Roberts to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (Sept. 13, 2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, nominee for Chief
Justice of the Unites states Supreme Court), available at http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:23539.wais (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, An Overview of the October 2006 Supreme
Court Term, 23 TOURO L. REV. 731, 734–738 (2008) (arguing that the Court was conservative in the 2006–07 term).
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5

mission is Exhibit A for this proposition, although the Roberts
Court’s non-deferential approach can be seen in earlier political
speech cases such as Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to
6
7
Life, Inc. and Davis v. Federal Election Commission. Certainly Citizens
8
United is the most dramatic instance of judicial activism by the Roberts Court involving political speech because the majority overruled
two earlier Supreme Court decisions, invalidated a federal law of
long-standing, and, by implication, invalidated parallel state cam9
paign finance provisions in at least 24 states.
In addition to their immediate and direct effect on the content of
federal campaign finance regulation, these decisions strengthening
First Amendment protection for political speech have called into
question the validity of the Internal Revenue Code’s regulation of political campaign activity. In particular, the campaign activities of
10
11
nonprofit organizations are subject to federal tax law (the “Code”)
as well as federal campaign finance regulation (the Federal Election
12
Campaign Act or “FECA”).
The provisions of these two statutory

5
6
7

8

9

10

11

12

See supra note 2. This theme is the focus of Justice Stevens’ dissent in Citizens United. 130
S. Ct. at 929 et seq.
551 U.S. 449 (2007).
128 S. Ct. 2759, 2775 (2008) (invalidating the millionaire’s provision); see also McComish
v. Bennett, 130 S. Ct. 3408 (2010) (granting a stay preventing enforcement of part of Arizona’s decade-old public financing law).
See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581,
581 (2011) (calling the Citizen’s United decision a “blockbuster”); John McArdle, Politics,
Roll Call, March 4, 2010, at 9 (describing the opinion as having sent “shock waves
through the political world”); Editorial, supra note 4 (asserting the “Roberts court[‘s]. . .
determination to act aggressively to undo aspects of law it found wanting, no matter the
cost”).
The judicial precedents are McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) and Austin v. Mich. State
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). The federal statute invalidated in Citizens United was originally enacted as 18 U.S.C. § 610. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 619, 62
Stat. 723 (1948) (banning political contributions by national banks, corporations, or labor organizations). For the impact of Citizens United on state campaign finance laws, see
CU + The States, STATEOFELECTIONS.COM, http://electls.blogs.wm.edu/citizens-unitedand-the-states (last updated Feb. 2, 2011).
In the Internal Revenue Code, nonprofits are referred to as “exempt organizations.” See
I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006). The two terms are not interchangeable, however. Nonprofit status is conferred under state law, and not all state law nonprofits qualify as exempt organizations under federal tax law. Nonetheless, for the sake of brevity, this Article sometimes
uses the term “nonprofit” to mean “exempt organization.”
All references to the Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (the
“Code”). Throughout this article, references to “tax law” refer to the federal income tax
provisions in the Code and the associated regulations and administrative authorities, unless otherwise noted.
2 U.S.C. § 431 et. seq. (2000) (“FECA”).
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13

regimes are very different, so that a specific campaign-related activity engaged in by a nonprofit may be subject to campaign finance restrictions under FECA, but not subject to tax law restrictions under
the Code, or the reverse. Alternatively, both statutes may regulate the
scope or manner of a specific kind of campaign related activity, but to
different degrees or in different ways. Ultimately these differences
can be traced to the fact that the two statutory regimes have been
enacted to further different public purposes. That the two regimes
are administered and enforced by different agencies, with differing
missions, powers, and histories, creates additional layers of complexi14
ty.
The Code’s restrictions on campaign activity, which apply primari15
ly to exempt organizations, extend to a wider range of election related activities than is considered constitutional under federal election law. As a result, these restrictions are usually regarded by the
16
regulated organizations as more intrusive than FECA restrictions. It
is not surprising, then, that in 2009, lawsuits were filed challenging,
inter alia, the constitutionality of the tax law restrictions as they apply
17
to a 501(c)(3) organization and a 501(c)(4) group. The plaintiffs in
13

14

15
16
17

In this Article, the phrase “statutory regime” includes the rules created by the statute
combined with the implementing regulations and administrative decisions and pronouncements, as these have been interpreted by the relevant agencies and the courts.
See Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625,
627 (2007) (arguing that “Congress’ current approach to regulating 527s will almost certainly result in a confusing and ineffective legal regime,” discussing a “framework for evaluating which of two bodies of law is best suited to regulate a particular set of activities,”
and proposing “specific changes to how Congress has and continues to approach the
regulation of political activity and 527s”); see also Elizabeth Kingsley & John Pomeranz, A
Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Collide in Regulation of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 58–59 (2004) (responding
to efforts by campaign finance reformers to import tax law standards into campaign
finance law by arguing that the different purposes of the two regimes would make such
endeavors unwise).
See infra Part I.A. The definition of campaign activity is also important for sections
162(e), 271, 276, and 527 of the Code.
See infra Part I.
See Complaint, Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, No. 5:09-cv-144-Oc-10GRJ,
2010 WL 3061800 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Complaint, Christian Coal.] (dismissing the challenge to restrictions as applied to a 501(c)(4) group); Complaint, Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-cv-670-IEG (AJB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96070
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009) (dismissing the challenge to restrictions as applied to a
501(c)(3) group) [hereinafter Complaint, Catholic Answers]. Both complaints assert that
the tax provisions are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Both also rely upon Big
Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1980), which holds that the
definition of “educational” in an IRS regulation lacked sufficient specificity to be constitutional. For the trial court decisions, see Christian Coal., 2010 WL 3061800; Catholic Answers, 2009 WL 3320498.
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these cases relied, in part, on the First Amendment standard an18
nounced in the campaign finance context in Wisconsin Right to Life.
To date, the constitutionality of the tax restrictions on political activity has been adjudicated only once. In Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, a
decision involving a church that placed political ads in two national
newspapers on the eve of the 1992 presidential election, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld
the tax law political prohibition for 501(c)(3) organizations in the
19
face of both free speech and free exercise challenges.
It is thus likely that in the next few years, the Supreme Court will
be asked to address the constitutionality of the tax law restrictions on
campaign activity. This Article examines whether the constitutional
law doctrine developed in response to campaign finance restrictions
on political speech should be applied to the parallel restrictions on
the same type of speech imposed by tax law. The Article focuses on
the prohibition preventing section 501(c)(3) organizations from undertaking political campaign activity, although much of the analysis
would also apply to the less restrictive limitations on the campaign activities of other groups described in section 501(c).
Parts I–III discuss three critical areas in which the campaign
finance regime and the federal tax regime can produce inconsistent
results for nonprofits active during political campaigns: (1) the categories of election related activity that may be restricted, (2) the proper method for agencies to use to determine if a group’s activities have
violated their restrictions, and (3) the level of scrutiny a court will
employ to determine if a restriction violates constitutional norms.
These three areas were central to the reasoning in Wisconsin Right to
Life and Citizens United, and they will undoubtedly provide the framework for determining the constitutionality of the restrictions on political campaign activity contained in tax law.
Part IV.A analyzes how the traditional tax constitutional doctrines
discussed in Parts I–III are likely to be applied to the political prohibition preventing 501(c)(3) organizations from participating in political campaigns. I conclude that it would be inappropriate to import
18
19

See Complaint, Christian Coal., supra note 17, at ¶ 64; Complaint, Catholic Answers, supra
note 17, at ¶ 31.
Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to the IRS). See infra notes 154 and 168 and accompanying text. For the free exercise claim, see Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 142–43; for the
free speech claim, see id. at 143–44. See also Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 40 F.
Supp. 2d 15, 26–27 (D.D.C. 1999) (the trial court decision). The Supreme Court upheld
tax law restrictions on lobbying by charities in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Washington (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 550–51 (1983).
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the campaign finance First Amendment standards developed by Citizens United and Wisconsin Right to Life into tax law First Amendment
jurisprudence because the constitutional principles underlying the
two spheres of constitutional law are fundamentally different, permitting more intrusive regulation by the tax code than by FECA.
Part IV.B then analyzes the political prohibition in light of the “rational relation” test endorsed by tax law jurisprudence in comparable
situations and concludes that the prohibition’s purpose and the
means chosen to achieve that purpose are likely to pass constitutional
muster. The rational relation test is appropriate because existing tax
law precedents make clear that the impact of the political prohibition
on exempt organizations will not be deemed a burden as a matter of
constitutional law. This is the case even if the organizations in question will suffer economically from a loss of revenues if they forgo tax
exemption in order to be involved in political campaigns. Thus, the
political prohibition should survive challenge unless the Supreme
Court uses the occasion to consider overruling the established tax law
precedents. Such a possibility is real because of the Roberts Court’s
20
“deregulatory” turn in the area of campaign finance.
Part IV.C examines the possibility that the political prohibition
may be deemed unconstitutional because of overbreadth or vagueness. I conclude that the overbreadth claim will not succeed because
it presupposes the very doctrine that it seeks to prove. The vagueness
claim is stronger because of the relative lack of precision in the terms
of the prohibition and the authorities elaborating its meaning. This
Part concludes that the Supreme Court might examine this question
using a form of heightened scrutiny and that, in such an event, the
outcome is less certain than the outcome of the previous inquiries.
Thus, although it seems that the balance of authorities favors upholding the political prohibition in the tax code despite the dramatic
changes made by the recent campaign finance cases, some ambiguity
remains as to its constitutionality using existing tax doctrines. In the
event that the prohibition is invalidated on vagueness grounds, the
Internal Revenue Service will have to elaborate the terms of the prohibition in greater detail in precedential guidance before the existing
regulatory regime could be reinstated.

20

See Hasen, supra note 8, at 585 (“[T]he Court’s jurisprudence, while certainly shifting toward a deregulatory direction, may not move to complete deregulation unless the Court
is willing to endure continued public backlash.”).
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I. THE COMPETING REGIMES: CATEGORIES OR ELECTION RELATED
ACTIVITY SUBJECT TO GOVERNMENT REGULATION
A. The Expansive Tax Law Approach
21

Since 1954, the Internal Revenue Code has prohibited charities
22
from participating or intervening in political campaigns. According
to the statute, publishing and distributing statements count as intervention, and activity taken in opposition to a candidate counts to the
23
same degree as activity in support of a candidate. The implementing Treasury regulations add that the prohibition applies to indirect
24
as well as direct political participation. The political prohibition was
added to the description of charitable entities in 1954 as a result of a
floor amendment proposed by then Senator Lyndon Johnson. Although the legislative history of the 1954 enactment is silent as to the
25
immediate reason for enacting the provision, political activities of

21

22
23

24
25

“Charities” is shorthand for organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code and
exempt from federal income tax because of their educational, religious, scientific, and
other activities specified in the Code.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
Id. Until 1987, the statute did not contain the phrase “or in opposition to.” See Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100–203, 101 Stat. 1330–464, § 10711 (1987).
However, campaign activity was always understood to include both support and opposition to a candidate for public office.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(ii), (c)(3)(iii) (1987).
See H.R. 7835, 73d Cong. §§ 101(6), 406 (1934). Only the lobbying limitation was
enacted into law in 1934. ROBERT B. BURDETTE, MARIE B. MORRIS & THOMAS B. RIPY,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 87–298 A, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: LOBBYING AND
POLITICAL ACTIVITY 3 (1987). A provision limiting charities’ participation in “partisan
politics” was approved by the Senate in 1934 at the same time as the provision limiting the
lobbying permissible for charities was enacted, but the political participation provision
was not enacted into law, and it is unclear why it was dropped. Both provisions may have
been inspired by an earlier court decision stating that “political agitation” should not be
paid for by “public subvention.” Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930). For
theories regarding the origin of Johnson’s amendment, see generally Deirdre D. Halloran & Kevin M. Kearney, Federal Tax Code Restrictions on Church Political Activity, 38 CATH.
LAW. 105, 106–08 (1998); Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation,
and Electoral Politics by Charitable Organizations under the Internal Revenue Code and Related
Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 23–29 (2003); Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the IRS: Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
145, 152–53 (2006); Patrick L. O’Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical Perspective
of the Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C.L. Rev. 733, 746–67
(2001); infra note 26.
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charities had been the subject of Congressional hearings and propos26
als several times in the previous decades.
In contrast to charities, organizations described in other subsections of section 501(c) are permitted to participate or intervene in
political campaigns. These include social welfare and civic organizations described in section 501(c)(4), labor organizations described in
section 501(c)(5), and trade associations and chambers of commerce
27
described in section 501(c)(6). Such organizations, however, must
be primarily engaged in promoting the mission that is the basis of
their respective exemptions. Campaign activities are not considered
28
to promote an exempt purpose for any subsection of section 501(c).
Thus, 501(c) organizations other than charities are permitted to engage in campaign activities, but if these become extensive enough,
they can undermine an organization’s claim to be devoted primarily
to its exempt purpose. Moreover, private benefit and certain commercial transactions, if any exist, must be aggregated with the group’s
campaign intervention to determine if the group is organized and
29
operating primarily for its exempt purpose. In addition to these li26

27
28

29



See Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate—Never the Twain Shall Meet?, 1
PITT. TAX REV. 35, 45–53 (2003) (discussing the impetus behind the enactment of the
provision prohibiting tax-exempt organizations from engaging in political activities and
the enactment of the House Select Committee which was meant to ascertain whether
these organizations were influenced by Communists and were not engaged in politics);
Roger C. Colinvaux, Citizens United and the Political Speech of Charities 5–10 (Dec. 17,
2010) (unpublished draft), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1726407.
IRS, Fact Sheet 97–8: Political Activity of Exempt Organizations, I.R.S. (Feb. 1997),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-97-8.txt [hereinafter IRS, Fact Sheet].
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(ii) (“The promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of
or in opposition to any candidate for public office.”); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,286,
1975 GCM Lexis 391 (May 22, 1975) (“[T]he exemption of a labor organization . . . will
not be affected by its participation in political activities of the nature described in its
submission provided that its primary purposes and activities still entitle it to such exemption.”); IRS, Fact Sheet 97–8, supra note 27 (“Charities exempt from tax . . . and eligible to
receive tax deductible charitable contributions may devote no more than an insubstantial
amount of their overall activities attempting to influence legislation . . . .”). In contrast,
campaign activities are the core of the exempt purpose of section 527 groups. See I.R.C. §
527(e) (2006) (defining a political organization that is “operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or both,
for an exempt function.”).
The “primarily” standard is undefined and controversial. When litigating against social
welfare organizations, the IRS has repeatedly argued that the “primarily” standard means
that a group’s non-social welfare activities cannot be “substantial.” See Vision Servs. Plan
v. United States, 2006–1 T.C. ¶ 50,173, aff’d 2008–1 T.C. ¶50,160, cert. denied 129 S. Ct.
898 (2009); Brief for the United States in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, Vision Serv. Plan, Inc. v. United States,2008–1 T.C. ¶50,160 (2008) (No. 08–
164) (arguing that “a single nonexempt purpose, if substantial in nature, renders an organization ineligible for tax-exempt status”). At least one official of the IRS has stated
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mitations, such organizations may also be subject to a tax calculated
30
using the dollar amount of their campaign expenditures as a base.
Thus, all 501(c) exempt organizations are subject to restrictions
on their campaign activity. Because the Code and the implementing
Treasury regulations do not elaborate which election-related activities
qualify as participating or intervening in political campaigns, the
meaning of these terms must be derived from various Revenue Rulings, numerous other administrative pronouncements, and a few
31
court cases. These authorities elaborate an expansive view of the
types of election related activities that are subject to the tax law restrictions. In addition to the obvious culprits, such as communicating
or funding a message that expressly endorses a specific candidate or

30

31

that a social welfare organization may be entitled to exemption even if 49% of its activities
are not devoted to social welfare. See Judy Kindell on § 501(c)(4)–(6) Organizations and
§ 527, 11 PAUL STRECKFUS’ EO TAX J. 42, 45 (2006) (stating that as long as more than
50% of an organization’s activity is in furtherance of their exempt purpose, an organization is entitled to exemption); see also Roundtable Discussion with Miriam Galston, Marc
Owens and Celia Roady, 9 PAUL STRECKFUS’S EO TAX J. 19, 24 ( 2004) (discussing what
“primary” means in the 501(c)(4) context). Whatever the standard, the IRS can measure
more than a group’s expenditures for election activities to determine if the standard is satisfied, as it does with the lobbying standard, where the importance of lobbying for a
group’s mission matters as well as the cost of its lobbying. See Haswell v. United States,
500 F.2d 1133, 1147 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975) (“Distribution of expenditures is only one measure of the substantiality of NARP’s political activities.”); Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558, 589 (1994), aff’d on other grounds in 37 F.3d
216 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1192 (1995) (“Whether an activity is substantial
is a facts-and-circumstances inquiry not always dependent upon time or expenditure percentages.”).
See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (2006). Section 527(f)(1) provides that the tax will be assessed on
the lesser of the amount of a group’s campaign expenditures or its net investment income. Groups with little net investment income will thus have relatively little tax exposure no matter how much they spend on campaign activities.
For examples of the Revenue Rulings, see Rev. Rul. 2007–41, 2007–1 C.B.. 1421; Rev. Rul.
2006–4, 2006–1 C.B. 264; Rev. Rul. 86–95, 1986–2 C.B. 73; Rev. Rul. 80–282, 1980–2 C.B.
178; Rev. Rul. 78–248, 1978–1 C.B. 154; Rev. Rul. 76–456, 1976–2 C.B. 151; Rev. Rul. 74–
574, 1974–2 C.B.. 161; Rev. Rul. 72-512, 1972-2 C.B. 246; Rev. Rul. 72–513, 1972–2 C.B.
246; Rev. Rul. 67–71, 1967–1 C.B. 125; Rev. Rul. 66–256, 1966–2 C.B. 210. Judicial decisions include Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Ass’n of
the Bar of New York v. Comm’r, 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030
(1989); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989);
Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981). See
also Democratic Leadership Council, Inc. v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C.
2008); Am. Campaign Acad.v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
Important nonprecedential guidance includes: Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,811 (June 30, 1989); I.R.S. Tech.
Adv. Mem. 91–30–008 (Apr. 16, 1991); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91–17–001 (Sept. 5, 1990);
see also IRS, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2003, at 335 (2002). Several of the preceding sources are
discussed infra Part II.A.

878

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:4

contributing money to a candidate’s campaign, the Service also classifies as campaign intervention all activities that support or oppose a
candidate for office or otherwise intervene in an election, indirectly
as well as directly. For example, for IRS purposes, running a preelection television ad that disparages a candidate’s character and denies her fitness for elected public office will be considered campaign
intervention. Less obviously, the New York City Bar Association’s
nonpartisan rating of candidates running for election as judge disqu32
alified it from receiving exempt status as a 501(c)(3) organization.
Despite the fact that it often gave multiple competing candidates the
same highest rating and political party played no role in its evaluations, the Service determined that the Bar Association’s act of rating
candidates for elective office constituted intervention in a political
33
campaign.
The IRS may find a candidate debate that includes all the candi34
dates for a particular office nonpartisan and thus not subject to
these restrictions. The debate may, however, be classified as campaign activity if the content of the questions, the format of the debate, or anything else appears to favor or disfavor one candidate in
35
comparison to the others. Similarly, a 501(c)(3) organization may
invite candidates to speak at group functions, but only if it invites
competing candidates to functions of comparable importance to the
36
host group. This limitation does not apply, however, if a candidate

32

33
34

35

36



See Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York v. Comm’r, 858 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989) (“In pursuing this activity, the Association falls clearly
within the definition of an ‘action’ organization, i.e., one that ‘participates or intervenes,
directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office.” (internal citation omitted) (emphases in original)).
See id. at 880–82.
It is unnecessary to include all candidates in all instances, however. See Judith E. Kindell
& John F. Reilly, Election Year Issues, in IRS, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2002, at 335, 374
(2001) [hereinafter 2002 CPE], available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/
ebook/part3/documents/electionyearissues.pdf (“Many times, the number of legally
qualified candidates for a particular office is so large that an IRC 501(c)(3) organization
may determine that holding a debate to which all legally qualified candidates were invited
would be impractical and would not further the educational purposes of the organization.”).
Rev. Rul. 86–95, 1986–2 C.B. 73; see also Rev. Rul. 66–256, 1966–2 C.B. 210. Rev. Rul. 8695 explicitly mentions facts and circumstances suggesting a neutral manner or showing “a
bias or a preference with respect to the views of a particular candidate.” Rev. Rul. 2007–
41, 2007–1 C.B. 1421, 1423.
See 2002 CPE, supra note 34, at 381 (“An IRC 501(c)(3) organization that invites one candidate to speak at its main banquet of the year and invites an opposing candidate to speak
at a sparsely attended general meeting will likely be found to have violated the political
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is invited to a group’s function in a capacity other than as a candidate, e.g., as a spokesperson for a particular issue of interest to the
37
For example, an environmental group could
group’s members.
have invited Al Gore to speak to its members in the weeks before the
2000 presidential election, even though he was a candidate for President, as long as no mention was made of the election, no money was
raised for Gore’s campaign, and there were no endorsements of his
candidacy. Questionnaires sent to candidates and disseminated to
voters or the publication of voting records may be nonpartisan or
they may evidence bias and constitute prohibited campaign activity.
Bias, according to the Service, can be inferred by the narrowness of
the subjects covered, the timing of the distribution, or the extent of
38
the distribution as well as by editorial content.
In short, under the tax law, diverse activities and communications—none of which is an express endorsement of one or more candidates for public office—may constitute political intervention of the
kind prohibited to 501(c)(3) organizations and subject to restrictions
in the case of groups exempt under other subsections of 501(c).
B. The Minimalist Campaign Finance Law Approach
Traditionally, the three main types of federal campaign finance
regulation were disclosure rules (primarily registration and reporting
rules); limitations on the amount that individuals and entities can
contribute in a year or election cycle to candidates and parties or to
their committees (the “amount” rules); and prohibitions on corporations and unions spending money from their general funds for certain types of election related speech (the “source” rules). In 2010, in
Citizens United, the Supreme Court invalidated the source rules for
expenditures made by corporations (and, by implication, for unions)

37

38

campaign prohibition, even if the manner of presentation for both speakers is otherwise
neutral.”).
See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1423-24 (listing as a criterion, for example,
“whether the individual speaks only in a non-candidate capacity”); 2002 CPE, supra note
34, at 381–82 (“Candidates may also be invited to speak at events by IRC 501(c)(3) organizations in their capacity other than as a candidate.”).
See Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154 (analyzing factors such as the narrowness of issues
covered in the organization’s publication, how widely distributed it was, and whether it
was distributed during a political campaign); Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178, 179 (holding that the publication of a newsletter that contained the voting records of Congressional incumbents did not constitute participation in a political campaign because it was not
widely distributed and involved only a small distribution in a particular congressional district). For other factors affecting whether election related activities will be characterized
as political intervention, see infra Part II.A.
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as long as they act independently of candidates, parties, and their
39
committees. However, the Court upheld the disclosure rules applicable to independent corporate expenditures, and it did not address
the validity of the rules preventing corporations and unions from
40
making political contributions.
The categories of campaign activity subject to regulation by FECA
are for the most part precisely and narrowly defined, a fact usually
explained in terms of First Amendment considerations. Specifically,
the Supreme Court takes the view that campaign-related speech is
core political speech that is protected by the First Amendment of the
Constitution and essential to the successful working of democratic
41
processes. When such speech is burdened by regulation, the government must justify its action by demonstrating a sufficiently strong
state interest and persuading the Court that the restrictions imposed
are designed to accomplish that interest in a fashion no broader than
42
the applicable constitutional standard permits.
As elaborated by the courts, the First Amendment protection of
political speech permits campaign finance regulations designed to
prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption in elections, but
not to equalize the resources available to different participants in the
43
political process. Although burdensome to some degree, campaign
contributions may be regulated by FECA because they involve transfers made directly to candidates or parties. Thus, they are most likely
to leave the recipients feeling indebted to donors and to create occa-

39

40

41
42

43

See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). However, if corporations or unions
coordinate their actions with candidates or campaigns, the expenditures will be treated as
campaign contributions and subject to the rules for contributions.
The Court applied two distinct levels of heightened scrutiny, depending upon the type of
campaign activity involved and the degree to which the speaker’s speech is burdened. See
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915–17. These are discussed infra Part III.
See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. at 2773–74 (endorsing this view and citing earlier decisions
and dissents to the same effect).
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–28 (1976) (per curiam) (requiring that the state “employ[] means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms”); United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 577–78 (1957) (quoting a Senator
stating that large contributions make political parties feel obligated to the donors). In
this section of the article, I associate gratitude, influence, and access with corruption.
This is the approach taken by the Supreme Court until recently. In Citizens United, however, the majority claimed that only quid pro quo corruption constitutes corruption for
campaign finance law purposes. The Court’s claim, however, does not comport with the
precedents. See the discussion infra notes 127–138 and accompanying text.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48 (stating that “[a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for
federal office is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy . . . .”).
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44

sions for corruption. In contrast, funds spent by people or organizations independent of a campaign are subject to the least amount of
regulation. According to the Supreme Court in Buckley, the reason is
that, if the individual or group paying for a political communication
during a campaign acts independently of a candidate or political party, the risk of corruption is less likely than the risk is with campaign
contributions; in the former case, the candidate and party will not
control the timing or content of the communication and might even
45
find it unhelpful. The assumption seems to be that a candidate’s
lack of control of the activity reduces the likelihood of the candidate
feeling gratitude toward the one who makes the expenditure, even if
the result is helpful to the campaign.
The threat of corruption is nonetheless seen as real when inde46
pendent expenditures are made to endorse a specific candidate, de44

45

46



See FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (discussing how “large
financial contributions” create “political debts” and pose the risk of corruption). Regulation of campaign contributions is also permitted, according to the Supreme Court, because such regulation is only minimally burdensome. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–21. In
2006, however, the Court found certain contribution limits so low that they constituted a
violation of the First Amendment. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248–59 (2006).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (explaining that “independent expenditures may well provide little
assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.”).
There seems to be a disconnect between the theory and reality: when donors give millions of dollars to (non-registered) 527 groups, which are not subject to FECA source and
amount rules, the candidates benefited are likely to notice and can be expected to feel
indebted whenever (as is often the case) the 527 groups are known to support specific
candidates and parties. In addition, 527 group staff may be “independent” of campaigns
and candidates as a matter of law without being so in fact. See infra notes 47.
Although FECA does not define persons or entities who are independent, it does define
“independent expenditures” as funds used for express advocacy of a candidate for federal
office if they are “not made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion
of such candidate, the candidate’s authorized political committee or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006). See 11 C.F.R § 109.21(d)
(2011) (listing types of conduct that constitute “coordinated communication”). The
courts have invalidated FEC regulations that define “coordination” too narrowly, and
many commentators similarly assert that expenditures may be formally independent
while still being coordinated. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1739–
41 (2001) (discussing judicial standards for distinguishing between contributions and expenditures); Daniel W. Butrymowicz, Note, Loophole.com: How the FEC’s Failure to Fully Regulate the Internet Undermines Campaign Finance Law, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1708, 1710–11
(2009) (discussing a regulatory loophole in a rule promulgated by the Federal Election
Commission); Dan Eggen, Mixed Reaction to New FEC Rules on Candidates, Interest Groups
Working
Together,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM
(Sept.
2,
2010,
12:27
PM)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/01/
AR2010090106049. html; Eliza Newlin Carney, Time for Obama to Right the FEC: The Citizens United Ruling has put the Election Agency on the Spot, NATIONALJOURNAL.COM (Feb. 16,
2010), http://nationaljournal.com/columns/rules-of-the-game/time-for-obama-to-rightthe-fec-20100216?print=true; Fred Wertheimer, Supreme Court’s Corruption of Election Law,

882

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:4

spite their independence from candidates and parties, presumably
because express endorsements are likely, or would appear likely, to
be made in exchange for favors or to make the candidate feel behol47
den to the source of funds spent so visibly on his or her behalf. As a
consequence, although it struck down dollar limits on independent
expenditures, the Buckley Court upheld FECA’s independent expenditure disclosure rules “to achieve through publicity the maximum deterrence to corruption and undue influence possible” in addition to
disclosure’s role in providing voters with information about sources
48
of candidates’ funding. If individuals or groups coordinate their activities with candidates, political parties, or their committees, the possibility of corruption or the appearance of corruption is treated by
campaign finance law the same as if the funds were actually contributed to those who benefit because coordinated actions are likely to
create, or appear to create, political debt to the same degree as direct

47

48

POLITICO (Dec. 14, 2010, 11:57 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
1210/46410.html;.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27–28, 45 (indicating that government concerns about “preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption” are insufficient to justify limitations on independent expenditures). The Court does not categorically declare this to be the case,
and its holding only assumes the proposition’s validity arguendo. But this is the clear implication of the Court’s comment that expenditure caps limited to express advocacy
would leave a “loophole” for those seeking to exert “improper influence” on a candidate
through large expenditures of money. Id. at 45. The Buckley Court’s prediction, of
course, has proved correct. Further, it is common for those who make contributions or
expenditures classified as “independent” under FECA to have significant ties to the candidates or parties they are supporting. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 152,153–54
(2003) (noting, as a matter of law, Congress’s concern that access to a candidate can be
“sold” even by a group independent of the candidate and his or her campaign); id., at
156 n.51 (stating that the close relationship between “federal officeholders and the state
and local committees of their parties . . . makes state and local parties effective conduits
for donors desiring to corrupt federal candidates and officeholders”); SpeechNow.org v.
FEC, 567 F. Supp. 2d 70, 75 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting the “close relationships between party
operatives and the persons running prominent 527 organizations (who were in some instances one and the same),” although they did not “violate the letter of the law on independence and non-coordination”). On appeal, this decision was reversed in part and affirmed in part. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010); cert. denied,
79 U.S.L.W. 3268.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76; see also FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S.
431, 458–65 (2001) (arguing that party expenditures coordinated with candidates or their
committees can be used to circumvent contribution limits and can thus be constitutionally regulated to prevent corruption). At the time these cases were decided, only individuals could make unlimited independent expenditures for communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. Corporations were prohibited from making
such expenditures. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b) (2006) (prohibiting contributions by corporations and labor organizations). Citizens United overturned that prohibition. 130 S. Ct.
876, 913 (2010).

May 2011]

WHEN STATUTORY REGIMES COLLIDE

883

49

contributions. Implicit in these rulings is the view that feelings of
being beholden to a contributor, or political debt, are the petri dish
in which corruption, or the appearance of corruption, can flourish.
In contrast to the Buckley decision, Kennedy’s opinion in Citizens United made a point of emphasizing the informational value of disclosure
50
to the exclusion of its role in deterring corruption. This may be due
to the Citizens United majority’s desire, described below, to place new
limits on the meaning of corruption for campaign finance purposes,
51
which is discussed in Part III.
Until the Citizens United decision was handed down, FECA’s
“source” rules prohibited corporations and labor organizations from
spending money from their corporate or union general treasuries on
52
express advocacy or electioneering communications. The provision
reflected the view that potentially unlimited revenues from commercial enterprises and unions should not be permitted to fund partisan
campaigns. Such entities were, however, free to spend unlimited
amounts of money from their general treasuries for all electionrelated communications and activities other than express advocacy or
electioneering communications.
The force of the general treasury funding restrictions was nar53
rowed considerably in 2007 by Wisconsin Right to Life, and invalidated

49
50

51
52

53

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46–47 (discussing “disguised contributions”).
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (referring only to the first of Buckley’s three justifications for disclosure); id. at 915–16 (stating that the Court will not examine “the Government’s other asserted interests” because the informational function alone justifies the
disclosure provision). There is nothing in the Buckley passage to suggest that the Buckley
Court considered each of the three justifications listed to provide sufficient justification
for the burden imposed by disclosure rules. See supra note 47–49 and accompanying text.
Infra Part III. B.
See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(2) (2006). For the original meaning of the technical term
“electioneering communications,” see infra note 70. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43–44, appeared
to assume the validity of the source rules for express advocacy, as did FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986), and FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152–56
(2003). McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 103 (2003), which upheld the electioneering communication provision against a facial challenge, and also assumed the validity of the source
prohibition relating to express advocacy, as did FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S.
449, 455–58 (2007), which linked the electioneering communication provision of FECA
to communications that were the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The phrases
“general treasury” and “general treasury funds” refer to an entity’s funds resulting from
its business operations; these terms are contrasted, inter alia, with funds it raises for an affiliated political action committee (“PAC”). Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 473–74.
Corporations and unions were able to fund express advocacy and electioneering communications through their PACs.
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 469–70 (narrowing the meaning of “electioneering communications” to instances in which the communication is also express advocacy or its “functional equivalent”).

884

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:4

54

completely in 2010 by Citizens United. As a result, corporations and
unions are now permitted to use the revenue accumulated from their
business operations to fund express advocacy or any other kind of
campaign speech. These developments not only erased the source
restrictions on federal campaign financing. According to Professor
Daniel Ortiz, as a practical matter, they threatened to undermine
55
FECA’s restrictions on soft money as well, by casting doubt as to
56
their constitutionality. Others agreed, and the Republican National
Committee (RNC) went to court to have the FECA soft money restrictions on political parties declared unconstitutional. In Republican National Committee v. Federal Election Commission, the District Court for the
District of Columbia upheld the provisions, and the Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment, without an opinion, although Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas would have granted probable jurisdiction and
57
accepted the case for oral argument.

54

55

56

57

See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876 (overruling McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), as it applied to electioneering communications, and Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652 (1990), as it applied to independent corporate spending). Many commentators had concluded that Wisconsin Right to Life effectively overruled the electioneering
communication portion of McConnell. See Christopher J. Peters, Under-the-Table Overruling,
54 WAYNE L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2008) (stating that Wisconsin Right to Life “gutted McConnell’s conclusion” that the electioneering communication provision was not unconstitutionally broad); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Difference Two Justices Make: FEC v. Wisconsin Right
to Life, Inc. II and the Destabilization of Campaign Finance Regulation, 1 ALBANY GOV’T L.
REV. 141, 142 (2008) (asserting that the holding in Wisconsin Right to Life II “robs the
[electioneering communication] ban of any content”); Hasen, supra note 3 at 1065 (stating that Wisconsin Right to Life “mostly eviscerated” the ban on corporate and union soft
money funding for pre-election sham issue ads). Seven Justices in Wisconsin Right to Life
agreed that the formula articulated by the Wisconsin Right to Life plurality opinion
amounted to overruling McConnell. See Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 497–98 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the result), 525–28 (Souter, J., dissenting). According to Samuel Issacharoff, the Wisconsin Right to Life decision signaled that the Court was “poised once again to
make a decisive move against Buckley.” Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional Logic of Campaign Finance Regulation, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 373, 374 (2009). So far, however, the Court has
framed its actions as strengthening Buckley by overruling precedents unfaithful to Buckley’s teachings.
“Soft money” refers to contributions that can be raised without satisfying FECA’s disclosure, amount, and source rules. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122–23. It is also sometimes
referred to as “non-federal” or “unregulated” money. Id. at 123. “Issue ads” can be paid
for by “soft,”—i.e., unregulated—money, in contrast to “express advocacy,” which had to
be paid for with “hard” money—i.e., money subject to FECA disclosure, amount, and
source restrictions. See id. at 122–36.
See Ortiz, supra note 54, at 162–63. Ortiz’s article was published after Wisconsin Right to
Life was decided, but before the decision in Catholics United. Thus, he also warned that
Wisconsin Right to Life effectively enabled corporations and unions to spend unlimited
amounts of business revenues on everything short of express advocacy. Id. at 163.
See 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010) (affirming without opinion 698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C.
2010)).
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There is, then, a stark contrast between the breadth of the conception of campaign related speech subject to regulation for purposes of the federal tax law and the counterpart concept in federal campaign finance law. For campaign finance law purposes, it is unclear
whether any campaign related speech that is not a political contribution or an expenditure coordinated with a candidate or a political
party can be subject to regulation other than the soft money and dis58
closure rules. Under federal income tax law, in contrast, not only
express advocacy, but any campaign related speech or other action
that supports or opposes a candidate for public office, may be subject
to numerous restrictions, depending on the facts and circumstances
of the case.
II. ANTITHETICAL AGENCY METHODOLOGIES
A. The Tax Law Facts and Circumstances Approach
As was noted earlier, there are few bright line rules to follow to
determine whether a given election-related activity falls within the tax
59
law’s capacious understanding of political campaign activity. From
the time of its earliest rulings in this area, the Service has taken the
position that it will look at all the facts and circumstances surrounding an activity to determine if it is prohibited to 501(c)(3) organizations or restricted to other groups exempt under section 501(a) of
the Code. Making these determinations, of course, can involve the
agency in complex and nuanced examinations.
The character of the Service’s facts and circumstances test is cap60
tured by a Revenue Ruling issued in 2004. The ruling sets out six
58

59
60



The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81, enacted, and the McConnell Court upheld, regulation of communications funded by
state parties or committees, that “support” or “oppose” candidates for federal office. See 2
U.S.C. §§ 431(20), 441b(b); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170–71 (declining to strike down the
provision and giving deference to Congress). It is uncertain whether the Supreme Court
will in the future conclude that such communications are independent. See Miriam Galston, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and Justifications for Campaign Finance Regulation: The
Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. L.J. 1181, 1210–11 (2007) (discussing the relationship between such state funded communications and coordinated expenditures).
Express advocacy would necessarily be classified as campaign activity for federal tax law
purposes, as would contributing money to, or coordinating with, a campaign.
See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328. In 2007, the Service issued another ruling that collected and, in some instances restated, its positions in previously issued rulings and other
administrative materials. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. Rev. Rul. 2004-6 examines the “public advocacy” activities of 501(c) groups other than charities to see if they
would be “exempt function” activities were they carried out by a 527 political organization. If they are, the 501(c) group may be subject to tax. See supra note 30. Because the
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situations in which an organization exempt under section 501(c)(4),
501(c)(5), or 501(c)(6) funds one or more broadcast or print advertisements in the weeks preceding an election. Several additional facts
are common to all six situations. In each, the nonprofit funds a
communication discussing an issue of concern to the group and
urges whoever hears or reads the ad to contact a named public official to urge him or her to take some action consistent with the nonprofit’s agenda, and in each, the public official is a candidate in the
61
coming election. Thus, all the situations have numerous facts that
suggest, although they do not necessitate, that the organization sponsoring the ad is attempting to influence the outcome of the election
by portraying a candidate for public office as in favor of, or in opposition to, the group’s objectives.
At the same time, each situation described in the Revenue Ruling
might also be interpreted as grassroots lobbying or issue advocacy,
which would not be considered campaign intervention under the
Code. For example, in each situation the group urges the recipients
of the communication to ask the official named to fund an endeavor
the group cares about, to support or veto a legislative initiative, or to
oppose capital punishment. Under the tax law rules elaborated by
the Service, sponsoring lobbying messages of this kind is permitted to
501(c)(3) groups up to a certain limit and is permitted to a nonprofit
described in other subsections of 501(c) without any limit as long as
62
the subject of the lobbying is germane to the organization’s mission.
The 2004 Revenue Ruling describes the types of facts and circumstances that will determine whether, on balance, the Service considers
the nonprofit in each of the six situations to be engaged in campaign
intervention, on the one hand, or grass roots lobbying or issue advo-

61

62

exempt function of a 527 organization is “influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment” of individuals to public office, IRC
527(e)(2), the discussion in Rev. Rul. 2004–6 clarifies what activities will be considered
political campaign activities for 501(c)(3) groups as well as other groups described in
501(c).
For example, a candidate for governor of a state may be asked to take a certain position
regarding an imminent death penalty execution or a candidate for a legislature may be
urged to vote for or against a legislative proposal. See Rev. Rul. 2004–6 2004–1 C.B. 332
(Situation 5).
Charities described in section 501(c) can lobby as long as the lobbying is not “substantial.” See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)–1(b)(3)(i), (c)(3)(ii).
Nonprofits exempt under other subsections of section 501(c) can lobby without limit in
furtherance of their exempt purposes. See Rev. Rul. 71-530, 1971-2 C.B. 237-38 (holding
that although an “organization’s only activities may involve advocating changes in law,”
that does not preclude the organization from tax exemption); Rev. Rul. 67-187, 1967-1
C.B. 185; Rev. Rul. 61–177, 1961–2 C.B. 117 (501(c)(6) groups).
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cacy, on the other. For example, if the communication being questioned is part of a series of similar public messages sponsored by the
organization over a period of time, including times not scheduled to
coincide with an election, the pre-election message is less likely to be
63
considered campaign activity. Similarly, if the pre-election message
is linked to a specific event occurring near the time of the election,
the pre-election message is more likely to be considered grassroots
lobbying, especially if the non-election event is outside the organization’s control. For example, if an execution is scheduled to take
place shortly before or after the election in that state and the organization’s pre-election message deplores capital punishment and urges
citizens to call Governor X and tell him to place a moratorium on executions because of racial unfairness in sentencing patterns, the message might be classified as grassroots lobbying, even if capital pu64
nishment is a wedge issue in the Governor’s race in that state.
These facts would not, however, prevent the Service from finding that
the organization sponsoring the message was engaged in campaign
activity if the external event allegedly motivating the message was a
bill in the state legislature, say, to end capital punishment and it
could be shown that the sponsoring organization had influenced the
date on which the vote in the legislature was scheduled so it would
coincide with the election. Other facts possibly suggesting the existence of campaign activity would be a statement in the ad that the
official to be contacted supports or opposes the position favored by
65
the nonprofit, even if the ad avoids stating whether he or she is, or is
not, fit to hold that office.
The balancing method utilized by the Service in Revenue Ruling
2004–6 is identical to the method it has employed in Revenue Rulings
63

64

65

See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 330 (Situation 1), 332 (Situation 5) (describing circumstances in which issue advertisements create no tax exposure because they are not campaign activity).
Compare Rev. Rul. 2004–6, 2004–1 C.B. 332 (Situation 5) (stating that where an execution
had been scheduled and the message was part of a series, the pre-election message was
not campaign activity even though the candidate’s position was identified as opposed to
that of the organization), with id. at 332 (Situation 6) (stating that where there was no external event scheduled and the message was not part of an series, the pre-election message was campaign activity).
See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 330 (Situation 1), 332 (Situation 6) (stating that advertisements which do not identify the official’s position on the relevant issue may not be
considered campaign activity, while advertisements which appear just before the election
involving an oppositional candidate, and which target that candidate’s opinion, are likely
to be classified as campaign activity). But see id. at 332 (Situation 5) and supra note 61
(stating that advertisements which appear just before an election involving an opposing
candidate but which are part of an ongoing series of substantially similar advocacy communications are not necessarily campaign activity).
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discussing voter education and other types of activities that can be
partisan or nonpartisan—and thus campaign intervention or not for
Code purposes—depending upon the manner in which they are
66
conducted. At bottom, it entails the exercise of judgment to identify
significant facts, interpret them in light of the context in which they
occur, and determine the weight to accord to each.
B. The Campaign Finance Law Bright Line Approach
Although a facts and circumstances test may seem a reasonable
way to appreciate the complex character of an organization’s election-related activities, the probing and balancing method it employs
contrasts sharply with the bright line rule approach favored by the
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo and subsequent decisions, and reasserted by the plurality opinion in Wisconsin Right to Life.
The Buckley Court originally enunciated the express advocacy
bright line rule in response to its concern that the vague “for the
purpose of influencing a federal election” language in campaign
finance law would have the effect of chilling non-campaign speech,
67
especially the discussion of ideas and candidates. The Buckley Court
did not claim that all campaign-related speech other than express advocacy was discussion of ideas and candidates. Rather, it noted that it
could be difficult to distinguish core campaign speech (urging the
public to vote for or against a candidate) from other forms of politi68
cal speech and issue discussion. The express advocacy rule was a response to this dilemma, since it created a bright line rule to differentiate political speech not subject to campaign finance regulation from
speech that may be regulated.
The electioneering communication provisions enacted in 2002 as
69
part of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform were designed by Congress to add an additional, and important, category of
campaign speech that should be funded with hard money and subject
to FECA disclosure while respecting Buckley’s preference for bright

66

67
68
69

See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text (describing circumstances in which debates
hosted by a non-profit organization may be seen as non-partisan); Rev. Rul. 2007-41,
2007-1 C.B. 1421-26 (distinguishing permissible “voter education” activities from impermissible campaign interventions).
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 76–80 (1976) (per curiam) (construing section 434(e) to
apply only to express advocacy in order to avoid invalidation on vagueness grounds).
See id. at 78–79 (noting the line-drawing problems that arise in trying to distinguish issue
advocacy from “advocacy of a political result”).
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
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70

line rules. In upholding the constitutionality of these provisions,
the McConnell Court appears to have endorsed the bright line rule
71
approach as well. In ruling that regulation of electioneering communications was constitutional, the Court noted that there was no vagueness problem because the criteria listed in the definition were
72
both “easily understood and objectively determinable.”
In Wisconsin Right to Life, however, the Supreme Court rejected the
electioneering communication provision, despite the fact that it
created a bright line rule, because the provision could apply to more
73
than express advocacy or its “functional equivalent.” At the same
time, the Court reiterated its commitment to a bright line standard,
emphasizing that campaign finance provisions should not be applicable in a way that “open[s] the door to a trial” on every communication an organization contemplates funding or necessitate elaborate
74
discovery.
For the plurality Wisconsin Right to Life opinion, that
meant rejecting the FEC’s intent-and-effect test for classifying campaign ads, because the FEC’s test would require examining the larger
context within which political communications were designed and
75
broadcast. The opinion strengthened its “four-corners-of-the-text”
approach by asserting that, if evidence of the existence of campaign
activity and evidence of issues advocacy are equal, “the tie goes to the

70

71

72
73

74

75

As originally enacted, an electioneering communication was defined as a communication
referring to a candidate for public office, distributed through broadcast media, and targeted to a certain number of persons able to vote for (or against) the candidate, if the
communication occurred in the thirty days preceding a primary or the sixty days preceding a general election. Id. § 201(a); Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§
434(f)(3)(A),(C) (2000).
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 194 (2003) (rejecting the constitutional objections to
the new definition of “electioneering communication” under the Federal Election Campaign Act). The McConnell Court also upheld the constitutionality of a more indeterminate support/oppose standard, but only with regard to state and local political parties.
See id. at 166–71 (determining that the provision’s restrictions are “closely drawn” to serve
the Government’s objectives and rejecting arguments that they are overbroad and vague).
Id. at 194.
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 466–67 (2007). The Court attributed the requirement that electioneering communications be express advocacy or its functional
equivalent to the McConnell Court, id. at 465, although the four dissenting justices in Wisconsin Right to Life, who were part of the majority in McConnell, were adamant that this interpretation was not the opinion of the McConnell Court. See id. at 526–28 (J. Souter, dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s new test is “flatly contrary” to McConnell).
See id. at 466–69 (asserting that the standard “must entail minimal if any discovery, to allow parties to resolve dispute quickly without chilling speech through the threat of burdensome litigation.”).
See id. at 466–69 (declining “to adopt a test for as-applied challenges turning on the
speaker’s intent to affect an election”).
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76

speaker, not the censor.” The practical effect of the Wisconsin Right
to Life analysis is thus to create a presumption that political speech
that is not express advocacy must be deemed to be issue discussion or
grassroots lobbying until proven otherwise, and to require the government to satisfy this burden of proof without utilizing evidence that
77
a court could consider more than minimally contextual.
The Citizens United decision left this part of Wisconsin Right to Life’s
doctrine intact. Thus, the method now employed by the IRS to determine whether a nonprofit organization has intervened in a political campaign is exactly the method the Court rejected in Wisconsin
Right to Life, namely, a facts and circumstances test that entails taking
into account the larger context in which a communication or other
activity occurs. Additionally, in federal tax cases, the organization
seeking to avoid violating the campaign prohibition has the burden
78
of proof, whereas the effect of Wisconsin Right to Life’s tie breaking
rule is to place the burden of proof on the government, even as it restricts the government’s access to arguably relevant information.
III.

JUDICIAL SCRUTINY: STRICT OR LIGHT

First Amendment issues have arisen repeatedly in connection with
tax law regulations. In general, judicial controversies involving a First
Amendment challenge to the denial of tax exemption or tax deduction have developed a doctrine independent of First Amendment jurisprudence operating in other areas involving free speech. As is true
in other areas of First Amendment law, if there is no burden on a
protected right, the courts subject the government’s actions to the rational relation test, the lightest form of judicial scrutiny in the free
79
speech area. If, on the other hand, the government’s actions are
seen as burdening the speech rights of the affected party, the courts
use some form of heightened scrutiny to determine whether the government has subjected the affected party to an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a governmental benefit. What is unique in
76
77

78
79

Id. at 474.
The plurality opinion did agree that some recourse to context would be valid under its
interpretation of the constitutional constraints. See id. at 473–74 (“Courts need not ignore basic background information that may be necessary to put an ad in context . . . .”).
See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (“The burden is on the one attacking the
legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”).
See Regan v. Taxation with Representation (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) (judging the
lobbying restrictions on 501(c)(3) organizations as “not irrational”); Madden, 309 U.S. at
88 (“[T]he presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit
demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes.”).
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the tax area is that, as a general matter, denying taxpayers tax benefits is not seen as burdening their speech.
A. The Deferential Tax Law Approach
The tax law First Amendment decisions are, in general, deferential to government restrictions limiting taxpayers’ entitlement to deductions or exemptions because courts are reluctant to second guess
lawmakers’ determinations in the area of tax. Highlighting the high
level of its deference, the Supreme Court in Madden v. Kentucky asserted that a legislature’s tax classifications have “a presumption of
80
constitutionality.” Although this presumption exists in many areas
of the law, the Madden Court noted that the government’s discretion
81
in tax classifications is even greater than it is in other fields. As a corollary, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in tax
cases presumes that “statutory classifications are valid if they bear a
82
rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Because of
this presumption, the “burden is on the one attacking the legislative
arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support
83
it.”
If, however, tax classifications burden “the exercise of a fundamental right, such as freedom of speech, or employ a suspect classifi84
cation, such as race,” courts will employ “a higher level of scrutiny.”
Further, courts will subject to “strict scrutiny” any affirmative burden
85
that the government places on speech on the basis of its content.
80
81
82

83
84

85



Madden, 309 U.S. at 88 (cited in TWR, 461 U.S. at 547).
See Madden, 309 U.S. at 87–88 (noting the broad discretion given to legislatures in the
field of taxation).
TWR, 461 U.S. at 547. There is some ambiguity in the statement, however, since the full
sentence reads, “Generally, statutory classifications are valid. . . [,]” id., and, as discussed
below, the Court will subject statutes to a higher level of scrutiny in certain circumstances.
Madden, 309 U.S. at 88.
TWR, 461 U.S. at 547. This might seem to imply that the lobbying restriction at issue in
the case should have been reviewed with a higher level of scrutiny than the rational relation test since the restriction affects freedom of speech. However, the TWR Court does
not employ heightened scrutiny. This apparent inconsistency is reconciled by the Court’s
holding that a failure to subsidize does not, in and of itself, constitute a burden and does
not infringe the right. See id. at 549 (“We have held in several contexts that a legislature’s
decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right,
and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.”).
See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (“[F]or reasons that are obvious, a
tax will trigger heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment if it discriminates on the
basis of the content of taxpayer speech.”); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244–
50 (1936) (noting that the First Amendment prohibits imposing a tax on newspapers with
a large circulation when the goal of the tax is to limit the spread of information). See also
infra notes 102–108 and accompanying text (discussing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
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Judicial deference to legislative judgments in tax cases thus may be
diminished in certain instances involving the First Amendment, although the level of scrutiny or deference has not always been clearly
86
articulated. Importantly for the comparison between tax law and
campaign finance law, tax statutes that selectively exempt, or fail to
exempt, specific categories of speakers are not necessarily “constitu87
tionally suspect.” They only trigger heightened scrutiny if in addition they discriminate on the basis of content, run the risk of suppressing specific ideas or points of view, target the press, or target a
88
“small group of speakers.”
The seminal case in this area, Cammarano v. United States, reveals
how the Supreme Court determines whether the threshold condition
for “a higher level of scrutiny” is present, i.e., whether a fundamental
right has been burdened. In that decision, the Court upheld a provision of the Code that denied taxpayers an otherwise valid business
expense deduction for the cost of lobbying against a ballot initiative
89
that, if passed, would harm their business. The taxpayers had argued that the Code provision denied them a business expense deduction because of their involvement in constitutionally protected First
Amendment speech. In rejecting their claim, the Court countered
that the taxpayers’ exercise of free speech was not burdened by the
denial of a deduction. Rather, according to the Court, the taxpayers
were only being required to pay for their lobbying activities without a
90
government subsidy.
For First Amendment activities, in other
words, denial of a subsidy did not infringe on the exercise of a fundamental right. As a result, the application of heightened scrutiny
91
was not warranted.

86
87
88
89
90

91

529 (1958), in which the Court struck down a property tax exemption requirement that
the taxpayer execute a loyalty oath).
See the discussion of levels of scrutiny in Am. Soc’y of Ass’n Executives v. United States, 23 F.
Supp. 2d 64, 68–69 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d, 195 F.3d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Leathers, 499 U.S. at 444. See also infra note 93 and accompanying text.
Leathers, 499 U.S. at 447.
See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 499–500 (1959) (discussing the harmful
effects of the measures).
See id., 358 U.S. at 512–13 (stating that denying the taxpayers a deduction deprived them
not of free speech, but of free speech at the government’s expense). In his concurrence,
Justice Douglas observed that the First Amendment would have been violated only if
Congress had denied all deductions for ordinary and necessary expenses to a taxpayer
who lobbied. Id., 358 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, J. concurring).
There is no discussion of the level of scrutiny in the decision. The First Amendment portion of the challenge is disposed of in a single paragraph that distinguishes the “nondiscriminatory denial of [a] deduction” from “‘the suppression of dangerous ideas.’” See
id., 358 U.S. at 513 (rejecting the idea that the plaintiffs were denied tax deductions because of engaging in constitutionally protected activities).
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In dicta in Cammarano, the Supreme Court compared the policy
underlying the ban on business deductions for lobbying expenses
with the policy embodied in the provision of the tax law denying charitable tax exemption to otherwise qualified 501(c)(3) organizations
92
if they engage in a substantial amount of lobbying. More than two
decades later, in Taxation with Representation, the constitutionality of
this limit on lobbying by charities was itself subject to a direct challenge. The Supreme Court reiterated the teaching of Cammarano
that denying 501(c)(3) organizations a subsidy is not an infringement
upon speech, and the Court expanded Cammarano by stating that
strict scrutiny would not be required even if Congress chose to provide a tax subsidy selectively, e.g., to some but not all categories of
93
exempt organizations. As a result, the Court ruled against the public interest organization in the case, which had been denied
501(c)(3) charitable exemption because it proposed to lobby in
94
excess of the statutory lobbying limit.
The Supreme Court addressed the relationship between tax classifications and burdens on First Amendment freedoms again in 1989,
in Hernandez v. Commissioner. At issue in that decision was the taxpayer plaintiffs’ entitlement to section 170 charitable contribution deductions for the cost of spiritual classes conducted by trainers of the
Church of Scientology. The plaintiffs claimed that denying them
such deductions for the classes unconstitutionally “deter[red] adhe95
rents from engaging in [religious] auditing and training sessions.”
The Court, however, doubted that the “alleged burden” on the taxpayers’ free exercise of their religion was substantial because the effect of denying them the deductions was merely to increase the cost
96
of the classes. The Court’s holding in Hernandez is consistent with its
view, expressed in non-tax contexts, that economic hardship resulting
from a denial of government benefits does not necessarily implicate

92
93

94

95
96

See id., 358 U.S at 512–13 (comparing the policies).
See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 548
(1983) (declining to apply strict scrutiny to provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that
discriminated between lobbying organizations); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
192–93 (1991) (upholding regulations which prohibited providers from discussing abortion as a lawful option because such regulations were permissible conditions for funding);
Leathers, 499 U.S. at 450 (citing TWR and Cammarano with approval).
See Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 512–13 (upholding the Internal Revenue Code provision).
Under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) and the associated regulations, an organization can engage only in an “insubstantial” amount of lobbying.
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 698 (1989).
See id. at 699 (questioning the substantiality of the burden).
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the Constitution, even when First Amendment protections are af97
fected.
In both Cammarano and Taxation with Representation, the Supreme
Court discussed the government’s stated goal, that political
“[c]ontroversies . . . must be conducted without public subvention;
98
the Treasury stands aside from them.” In both cases, the Court emphasized that as a constitutional matter, “a legislature’s decision not
to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the
99
right . . . .” Thus, the government’s goal of securing its own neutrality and a level playing field for those who lobby was subjected to a
100
minimal burden of justification.
As the Cammarano Court explained, “since purchased publicity can influence the fate of legislation which will affect, directly or indirectly, all in the community, everyone in the community should stand on the same footing as regards
its purchase so far as the Treasury of the United States is con101
cerned.”
A tax classification, or a failure to subsidize a fundamental right,
nonetheless may violate the Constitution if a legislature’s action involves content discrimination or the intent to suppress certain ideas,
102
as occurred in Speiser v. Randall. In that case, a provision of the California Constitution and implementing legislation denied the State’s
veterans property tax exemption to any veteran who failed to sign a
loyalty oath stating that the signatory did not advocate the violent
overthrow of the government nor support a foreign nation at war
103
with the United States.
The exemption in question was sought by
certain World War II veterans who had received honorable discharges
104
and refused to sign the oath. The Supreme Court concluded that
the constitutional provision should be interpreted to mean what the

97
98
99

100
101
102

103
104

See infra notes 176–86 and accompanying text.
Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 512 (citing Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930).
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983);
see also Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring) (criticizing “the notion that
First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the
State”).
See discussion supra note 91 and accompanying text.
Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513.
See TWR, 461 U.S. at 548 (citing Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513 (quoting Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958))); see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 450 (1991) (noting
that a tax scheme which discriminates on the basis of a speaker’s ideas violates the First
Amendment). In Speiser, the Court struck down statutory provision, itself based upon a
provision of the California constitution that denied a property tax exemption to persons
who did not sign a loyalty oath. 357 U.S. at 529.
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 515.
Id. at 514–15.
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California Supreme Court said it meant, i.e., that it applied only to
those who actually engaged in speech that would be criminally pu105
nishable under California criminal law and not to abstract advocacy.
Thus construed, the loyalty oath was unconstitutional because it imposed on individuals failing to sign the oath an unreasonable condition, namely, the burden of proving they were not in violation of
106
criminal law.
This violated the applicants’ due process rights because the state’s reliance on a “short-cut” procedure (the oath) to determine whether people had violated a criminal statute might well
107
have the effect of infringing upon their free speech.
The Speiser Court said explicitly that the loyalty oath required by
108
California was “‘frankly aimed at the suppression of ideas.’” When
such factual situations arise, a heightened form of scrutiny, i.e., more
than the rational relation test, is required to determine if the regulation in question is constitutional. Subsequent tax law decisions have
distinguished Speiser’s holding when explaining why a particular go109
vernmental action is valid. These tax cases are consistent with, and
sometimes cite, First Amendment decisions in other areas of the law
invalidating government discrimination based upon the content of
110
speech or designed to suppress dangerous ideas.
Tax cases involving speech restrictions in connection with deductions or exemptions are portrayed by the Supreme Court as a subset
111
of cases involving a government subsidy or grant. In some non-tax
105
106
107

108
109

110

111



See id. at 519–20 (construing the constitutional provision).
See id. at 523–24 (determining that the loyalty oath violates the fundamental principle
that an individual should not be considered presumptively guilty of a crime).
See id. at 528–29 (holding that the provision’s enforcement procedures violate due
process). However, neither signing nor failing to sign the oath was conclusive as to an
applicant’s entitlement to the exemption. See id. at 521 n.6 (noting that it may be necessary for the claimant to allege and prove facts to justify the exemption).
Id. at 519 (quoting Am. Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,402 (1950)).
See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (rejecting the plaintiffs’
analogy to Speiser on the ground that there was no suppression of ideas in the tax statute);
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)
(noting the outcome would be different if the tax provision involved “the suppression of
dangerous ideas . . . .”).
See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972) (invalidating summary judgment
for a state college that failed to renew a faculty member on the grounds that the nonrenewal may have been a result of the fact that the faculty member had criticized the school
publicly, including before a legislative committee). See also FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383–84 (1984) (invalidating a regulation prohibiting nonprofit
broadcast stations that were recipients of federal funds from editorializing, which, the
Court said, was suppression of speech based upon content).
See, e.g., TWR, 461 U.S. at 544 (stating that “tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a
form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system.”). The equation of deductions and/or exemptions with subsidies has been challenged by numerous commentators.
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subsidy cases, the Court’s analysis is framed in terms of the nature
and validity of the conditions the government has placed on the reci112
In general,
pient, or potential recipient, of government funds.
these cases examine the type of government benefit involved, the
character of the right affected by the condition imposed, the degree
of the burden imposed by the condition, the importance of the government’s reason for imposing the condition, and the relationship
between the government’s purpose and the means chosen to achieve
113
it.
Subsidy cases are not, however, necessarily analyzed within this
framework. For example, in Rust v. Sullivan, the plaintiff organization challenged a speech restriction imposed upon the receipt of
114
federal funds as an unconstitutional condition.
In rejecting the
claim that this was an unconstitutional condition case, the Court said

112
113

114

See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV.
309, 344–45, 365–66 (1972); Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 304–307, 357–58 (1976)
(arguing that “nonprofit organizations engaged in ‘public service’ activities, broadly conceived, should be wholly exempted from income taxation . . . .”); Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy, Conceptualizing the Charitable Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998);
Johnny Rex Buckles, Do Law Schools Forfeit Federal Income Tax Exemption When They Deny Military Recruiters Full Access to Career Services Programs?: The Hypothetical Case of Yale University
v. Commissioner, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 42–45 (2009) (discussing several alternative theories
to the “subsidy theory”); see also Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 679–80
(1970) (asserting that a property tax exemption for a church does not violate the Establishment Clause because it is not a subsidy in every respect); Johnny Rex Buckles, The
Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contributions Deduction, 80 IND. L.J. 947, 952–53
(2005) (developing a non-subsidy theory of the charitable contribution deduction). For
an overview of this area, see Rob Atkinson, Theories of Federal Income Tax Exemption: Thesis,
Antithesis, and Synthesis, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395 (1997).
See e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543–49 (2001) (reviewing the conditions of funding in the LSC Act).
On the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as applied in tax exemption and deduction cases, see John Simon, Harvey Dale, & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of
Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267, 276
(Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg, eds. 2006) (concluding that the area is sufficiently murky that accurate predictions are impossible). The literature discussing the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions is voluminous. Some of the classic articles are David Cole,
Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power,
and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the
Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913
(2006); Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989 (1995); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). In the words of Steven Gey, “Virtually everyone agrees that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a mess.” Steven G. Gey, Contracting Away Rights: A Comment on Daniel Farber’s “Another View of the Quagmire,” 33 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 953, 953 (2006).
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991).
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our ‘unconstitutional conditions’ cases involve situations in which the
Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather
than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the
recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of
115
the federally funded program.

Rust involved Title X funding, and the speech restriction required
recipients of Title X money to abstain from informing patients of
abortion as a possible option for them to consider as part of family
116
planning.
The Court concluded nonetheless that grant recipients
were not prevented from counseling about abortion because they
were free to engage in such counseling using premises that were
117
physically separate from the facility receiving Title X funds. In support of its finding, the Court cited a passage in Federal Communications
Commission v. League of Women Voters, to the effect that the speech restriction on government funding in that case would have been
upheld if Congress had authorized the grant recipients to establish
affiliated entities to engage in the restricted speech without federal
118
funds. Thus, League of Women Voters, and Rust agree that if an alter119
nate channel exists for speakers to engage in the type of speech restricted by a federal grant or subsidy, there is no burden (as a matter
120
121
of law) and, a fortiori, no unconstitutional condition. Hence, the
validity of the restriction can be justified employing only a rational
basis test. To support their alternative channel argument, both deci122
sions cite Taxation with Representation of Washington, a tax decision
discussed below.

115
116
117
118
119
120
121

122

Id. at 197.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 196.
Id. (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984) (citing Regan v.
Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983))).
On the alternate channel doctrine, see infra pp. 154–158 and accompanying text.
Courts will concede that there is an economic burden, but an economic burden does not
imply the existence of a legal burden. See supra note 97 and infra notes 176–86.
Arguably Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez should be included in this list. In that case, the
Court found that the absence of an alternative channel for indigent clients of federally
subsidized legal services was an important factor leading it to invalidate the funding restriction imposed by Congress. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546–49
(2001) (invalidating the provision). However, the Court also said that the restriction
“suppressed speech inherent in the nature of the medium” (lawyering), id. at 543, and interfered with the judicial function. Id. at 546. Thus, it is unclear how the Court would
have ruled had there been an alternate channel for the plaintiff’s clients.
See infra notes 151–59 and accompanying text.

898

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:4

B. The Heightened Scrutiny of Campaign Finance Law
Outside the tax area, the Supreme Court generally employs strict
scrutiny or some other type of heightened scrutiny in cases involving
restrictions on free speech. As formulated in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny and content neutral restrictions are
123
evaluated by “intermediate scrutiny.”
These standards have been
applied in a wide range of circumstances involving regulation of individuals, non-business associations, corporations, the press, and other
types of media.
When campaign finance regulation is involved, however, the Supreme Court usually examines the regulations burdening speech us124
ing strict scrutiny.
The strict scrutiny standard typically entails determining whether restrictions on speech serve a compelling state
interest and whether the restrictions are narrowly tailored to further
125
that interest. Starting with Buckley and continuing through Citizens
United, the Supreme Court has maintained repeatedly and emphatically that the only compelling state interest justifying the regulation
of campaign speech is the need to prevent corruption or the appear126
ance of corruption.
On several occasions, the Court has equated preventing influence
over elected officials or access to them with the compelling state interest in preventing corruption or its appearance. For example, Buckley portrayed “undue influence” alongside of “corruption” as the objective that campaign finance regulations could legitimately seek to
127
deter.
In Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal
123
124
125

126

127

See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994) (basing this observation
upon earlier Supreme Court decisions).
Usually, but not always. See infra notes 142–45 and accompanying text.
See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007) (discussing the strict scrutiny
standard as it relates to political speech); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003). Not
all courts use the phrase “strict scrutiny.” The Court in Buckley, for example, said that restrictions affecting the First Amendment must be examined with “exacting scrutiny.”
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam). This has usually been equated with
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 291 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part). For a succinct statement of the strict scrutiny doctrine, with which
he vehemently disagrees, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and
Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418–24 (1996).
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25–26 (finding that an $1,000 contribution limitation imposed by
an Act was sufficiently supported by the Act’s primary purpose of limiting “the actuality
and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions . . . .”); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 901–02 (2010) (describing the view of
Buckley, with which the Court agreed).
See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
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Campaign Committee, the Court affirmed its understanding that corruption means “not only . . . quid pro quo agreements, but also . . . undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the ap128
pearance of such influence.”
As recently as the McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission, the Supreme Court stated that campaign finance
regulation is justified to “prevent the selling of [which] gives rise to
129
the appearance of corruption.”
Relatedly, numerous Supreme
Court decisions have stressed that avoiding the appearance of corruption is a compelling state interest in addition to avoiding corruption
itself. In Buckley, for example, the Court said
[o]f almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large
individual financial contributions . . . Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative Government is not
130
to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’

This passage in Buckley has been repeated numerous times in subse131
quent Court decisions.
In Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, the Supreme Court
enlarged the notion of corruption to include certain situations in
which the members or shareholders of a corporation do not necessar132
ily approve the political choices funded by it, an idea first endorsed
133
In Citizens
in dicta by the Court in Massachusetts Citizens for Life.
United, however, the Court repudiated this understanding of a com-

128

129

130
131

132

133

FEC v. Col. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado II), 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001)
(emphasis added) (holding “that a party’s coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures
truly independent, may be restricted to minimize circumvention of the Act’s contribution
limits”).
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 154; see also FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210
(1982) (acknowledging the traditionally recognized “governmental interest in preventing
both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption of elected representatives . . . .”).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (quoting Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 565 (1973)) (second emphasis added).
See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388–89 (2000); Davis v. FEC, 128 S.
Ct. at 2770; Col. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (“Colorado I”), 518 U.S. 604,
609 (1996); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97
(1985); FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982); Citizens Against
Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, Cal., 454 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1981).
494 U.S. 652, 663 (1990) (noting that shareholders that disagree with the Chamber’s political activity may not withdraw their funds because they want to benefit from its nonpolitical activities); see FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 159 n.5 (2003) (discussing whether the risk of corruption is sufficient to support regulation of political contributions).
See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986) (asserting that “the power of
the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas”).
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pelling governmental purpose, expressly overruling Austin. In addition, the Court made clear its intention to limit the concept of cor135
ruption to quid pro quo corruption rather than access or influence,
thereby adopting a position that several justices had endorsed in dis136
sent for many years. Perhaps because of that history of dissent, the
majority in Citizens United (which included all of the dissenters wishing to limit corruption in this way) failed to acknowledge the discrepancy between its view and the view of majorities of the Court in pre137
vious cases —another example of stealth overruling by the Roberts
138
Court. Unexpectedly, the Citizens United Court also noted that several times in the past the Supreme Court had observed that campaign
finance “restrictions on direct contributions are preventative, because
few if any contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo ar139
rangements.” Thus, despite all of its jurisprudential belt tightening,
the Citizens United Court did not strike down certain provisions preventing corruption or its appearance indirectly, i.e., provisions that
prevent circumvention of the quid pro quo prohibition.
Employing a corruption standard to limit government regulation
of political speech, the Supreme Court has struck down: 1) spending
limits for candidates for Congress and state elections; 2) limits on independent expenditures, a prohibition against corporate and union
political advertisements on the eve of elections paid for with soft
money; 3) a prohibition against certain advocacy organizations using
their general corporate funds for campaign expenditures; and 4)
special financing rules for candidates running against high wealth,

134

135
136

137
138
139

See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 901, 903–13 (2010) (stating that Austin provides
“no basis for allowing the Government to limit corporate independent expenditures,” as
it was overruled).
See id. at 909–10.
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 290–93 (2003) (Kennedy, J., with whom Justices Scalia
and Thomas joined, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Buckley limited the government’s compelling interest to quid pro quo corruption and citing Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297 (1981) for
this interpretation); see also Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative
Process, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 92–95 (2010) (noting that the notion of “corruption”
adopted by the Court in McConnell was not a “narrow, motive-based concern about quid
pro quo” but was rather “a broader conception that encompasses all the ways in which
wealthy interests achieve disproportionate influence over the legislative process . . . .”).
See supra notes 127–33 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908. The Court indicated that preventive measures were
necessary, even though quid pro quo transactions would fall under bribery laws, because
of evidentiary problems. Id. But cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that Congress was entitled to conclude “that contribution ceilings were a
necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance of corruption”).
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140

self-financing opponents. In Citizens United, the Court added to this
list by concluding that the state interest in preventing corruption or
its appearance was not sufficiently strong to justify denying corporations the ability to use business revenues to pursue their electoral ob141
jectives.
On a few occasions, the Supreme Court has employed an intermediate level of scrutiny in campaign finance cases. Intermediate
scrutiny permits the government to demonstrate something less than
a compelling interest to justify its imposition of restrictions on political speech, if the means chosen to further that interest are designed
in a proper manner. In First Amendment cases involving restrictions
on speech, the Supreme Court has often said that the intermediate
scrutiny test is satisfied if a restriction on speech “furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
142
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”
The means
chosen satisfy this “essential” standard if the government’s interest
143
“‘would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’”
In campaign finance cases, the Supreme Court appears to have
used intermediate scrutiny when it evaluated the constitutionality of
FECA’s limitations on the amount of political contributions that can
be made to candidates and parties. For example, in Buckley, the
Court applied what it referred to as the “lesser demand” of regulations being “closely drawn” to match a “sufficiently important [gov144
ernment] interest.” In connection with FECA’s restrictions relating
to public financing, the Buckley Court also compared the burden
caused by these restrictions with the burden resulting from state law

140

141
142

143
144

See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life Inc., 551 U.S. 449
(2007); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S.
238, 253–63 (1986); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39–58.
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–99 (1989)
(stating that the appropriate test to apply where political speech is burdened is the “narrow tailoring” test).
Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387–88 (2000) (discussing the standard
applied in Buckley); see also FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007) (citing
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–45, and four later cases repeating the need for strict scrutiny
whenever “political speech” is burdened); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16, 20, 25–26 (noting that
expenditure limits require “exacting scrutiny,” and because contribution limits involve
“only a marginal restriction” on free speech, they are constitutional where they are “closely drawn” to further the weighty interests” of preventing corruption).

902

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:4

restrictions on ballot access. Although the latter were subject to “exacting scrutiny,” the Court was less rigorous with the former because
public financing is “generally less restrictive of access” than ballot re145
strictions.
The Court did not expressly label its method “intermediate scrutiny” (or anything else), but it appears that it was using intermediate scrutiny since it employed a form of heightened scrutiny
that was clearly not strict scrutiny.
To summarize, tax law and campaign finance jurisprudence embody distinct and generally inconsistent principles regarding the
form of judicial scrutiny required to test the constitutionality of restrictions on speech. In the First Amendment tax cases, the courts
gravitate toward the rational relation test because of the presumption
of constitutionality, and heightened scrutiny is the exception. In
contrast, in campaign finance cases, the presumption is that strict
scrutiny applies, and a lesser form of heightened scrutiny is the exception. In the tax cases, it is permissible to discriminate on the basis
of the identity of the speaker, whereas in campaign finance law it is
not. In tax cases, the courts place the burden of proof on the party
challenging a government restriction on speech, whereas in campaign finance law it is exactly the reverse. Finally, underlying some
tax restrictions is the government’s interest in equalizing access to
government funding and creating a level playing field among participants in campaigns, whereas the campaign finance cases categorically
reject equalizing speakers’ resources as a valid government purpose
for burdening speech in any way. As a result of these differences, tax
law provisions that affect speech are far more likely to be upheld than
are restrictions imposed by campaign finance law.
IV.

TAX LAW FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED

Parts I–III gave an overview of the general principles of free
speech doctrine in the areas of tax exemption and campaign finance.
This Part applies the tax law principles to the restrictions prohibiting
section 501(c)(3) groups from engaging in political campaign activity.

145

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 94–96 (finding that such financing served “sufficiently important
governmental interests and has not unfairly or unnecessarily burdened the political opportunity of any party or candidate”).
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A. What Constitutes a Burden on Speech
Tax exempt organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the
Code must meet both affirmative and negative requirements. The affirmative requirement is that the group has as its purpose one or
more public goods that the Code and regulations characterize generically as “charitable.” These include helping the poor, sick, or disadvantaged; promoting education, religion, science, literature, and public safety; lessening the burdens of government; and otherwise
146
improving social welfare.
The negative requirements prohibit
501(c)(3) groups from benefitting any insider (“private inurement”),
having even one substantial non-exempt purpose, engaging in more
than insubstantial lobbying, and participating or otherwise interven147
ing in an electoral campaign for public office.
In addition, an organization cannot qualify for 501(c)(3) status if it engages in illegal
148
activity or violates public policy.
At first glance, based upon the traditional tax law constitutional
jurisprudence discussed in Parts I-III, the absolute prohibition against
501(c)(3) organizations participating in electoral campaigns would
seem not to violate the First Amendment. In a closely analogous situation, the Supreme Court upheld in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington the requirement that 501(c)(3) groups not engage
149
in substantial lobbying.
Cammarano v. United States, discussed
150
above, similarly upheld a prohibition on deducting the cost of lobbying that would otherwise have been an ordinary and necessary
business expense. The foundation of both decisions was the doctrine
that fundamental First Amendment rights are not burdened, as a matter
of constitutional law, by being denied a tax benefit, since the First
Amendment does not guarantee the right to exercise First Amend151
ment freedoms at the government’s expense. Because the right to

146

147
148
149
150
151



See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(i). The regulations also
mention lessening “neighborhood tensions,” prejudice, discrimination, community deterioration, and juvenile delinquency, and promoting human and civil rights. Id. at
§ 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2).
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b)(1)(iii), (b)(3),(c)(1),
(c)(3).
See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (noting that a “charitable
trust may not be illegal or violate established public policy”).
See supra notes 93–94, 99 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89–91, 99 and accompanying text.
See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 545
(1983) (noting that the Supreme Court has never held that Congress is required to provide subsidies to those who wish to exercise a constitutional right); Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (holding that the denial of tax deductions was permissi-
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lobby and the right to be involved in political campaigns are both
152
core First Amendment values, the constitutional analysis should be
153
the same in both areas.
Taxation with Representation, however, is arguably inapposite because the organization in that case was permitted to establish a sister
501(c)(4) organization that could lobby without limit, assuming that
154
none of its funds were derived from the 501(c)(3) group. Employing a sister organization this way would enable a 501(c)(3) group to
conduct its non-lobbying activities (and some lobbying activities as
well) using money subsidized by the charitable contribution deduction available to the group’s donors, while its 501(c)(4) counterpart
155
could lobby to an unlimited degree without funds thus favored.
The 501(c)(3) group’s ability to lobby using an affiliated organization
156
was noted by the majority opinion, and it was pivotal to the conclusion of Justice Blackmun’s concurrence that the taxpayer’s speech
157
rights had not been infringed.
This structural arrangement, which became formalized as the alternate channel doctrine, is now considered to be crucial to the out158
come in TWR.
For the alternate channel to enable the 501(c)(3)

152

153

154

155

156
157

158



ble where the denial was not due to the organization’s engagement in a constitutionally
protected activity);.
See TWR, 461 U.S. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing E.R.R. Presidents Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137–138 (1961) (stating that lobbying is protected by the First Amendment)).
See, e.g., Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for
501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L. J. 1313, 1317 (2007) (arguing that the subsidies justify such regulation). For the contrary view, see Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the Ban
on Participation in Political Campaigns by Charities Essential to their Vitality and Democracy? A
Reply to Professor Tobin, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1057, 1062 (2008) (arguing that some “electioneering” by charities is appropriate, and that there are alternatives to a blanket ban on
such activities).
See TWR, 461 U.S. at 544 n.6 (noting that it was possible for a 501(c)(3) organization to
establish a 501(c)(4). The Service also requires that the lobbying be in furtherance of
the group’s exempt purpose.
The 501(c)(4) group’s exemption is still a subsidy, according to the Court. See TWR, 461
U.S. at 544 (stating that the exemption is the functional equivalent of a “cash grant”). A
501(c)(4) group might be less heavily subsidized than a 501(c)(3) organization, however,
because the latter can combine the benefit of exemption from income tax with that of receiving funds from donors entitled to the charitable contribution deduction.
See TWR, 461 U.S. at 544–45 n.6.
See id. at 552–53 (stating that “[a] § 501(c)(3) organization’s right to speak is not infringed, because it is free to make known its views on legislation through its § 501(c)(4)
affiliate without losing tax benefits for its nonlobbying activities”). The concurrence of
Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
The majority opinion did not emphasize the alternate channel for lobbying available to
the plaintiff, but the concurrence considered it indispensable to the outcome in the case,
and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have adopted the view of the concurrence. See
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group to lobby meaningfully, according to the Blackmun concurrence, the organization needs to be able to control its affiliated
159
501(c)(4) group’s lobbying message.
In the area of campaign activity, the existence of an alternate
channel for the campaign activities of 501(c)(3) organizations is less
clear-cut than it is for lobbying by such organizations. Section 527 of
the Code authorizes the establishment of “political organizations,”
which are exempt entities created and operated “to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of one or more candi160
dates for public office.” Since a 501(c)(3) group is prohibited from
creating an affiliated section 527 political organization to engage in
161
campaign activities on its behalf, it seems to be denied the type of
sister organization crucial to Taxation with Representation’s validation
of the lobbying limitation.
Section 501(c)(3) organizations are, however, permitted to establish one or more sister 501(c)(4) groups, and the latter are permitted
to participate in campaigns as long as they remain primarily dedicat162
ed to their core social welfare mission. A 501(c)(4) group can thus
provide a channel for a 501(c)(3) organization’s electoral projects.
Yet the 501(c)(4) alternative channel for campaign activity is not the
exact equivalent of the 501(c)(4) channel for lobbying activity because 501(c)(4) groups are subject to a quantitative limit on their
campaigning, in contrast to their lobbying, because campaigning is
163
not considered social welfare. The 501(c)(4) group may be further
limited because all of its activities not classified as social welfare, e.g.,
commercial and private activities, must be aggregated and the total
compared to the group’s social welfare activities to determine if the

159

160
161
162
163

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) (pointing out that a party is not prevented from
carrying out practices that fall outside the scope of activities for which funds were given,
but that “they merely require that the grantee keep such activities separate and distinct
from Title X activities”); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984) (stating that broadcasting stations could establish “affiliate” organizations that use the same
facilities to editorialize without using federal funds). Several appellate and district courts
have similarly interpreted TWR. See Miriam Galston, Campaign Speech and Contextual Analysis, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 100, 113–17 (2007) (summarizing the importance of the
alternate channel option in TWR and subsequent cases).
See TWR, 461 U.S. 540, 553 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“It hardly answers one
person’s objection to a restriction on his speech that another person, outside his control,
may speak for him.”).
I.R.C. § 527(e)(1)–(2) (2006).
See S. REP. NO. 93–1357, at 30 (1974).
See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1 (1987) (stating that the “promotion of social welfare”
does not include the “direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office”).

906

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:4
164

group retains its primary focus on its exempt mission. The opportunity for a 501(c)(3) organization to participate in campaigns
through a sister 501(c)(4) group is thus correspondingly circumscribed. Finally, under some circumstances, a 501(c)(4) group may
165
be required to pay tax on the amount it spends on campaigning.
Thus, the 501(c)(4) alternate channel for 501(c)(3) groups that
wish to influence elections may provide the 501(c)(3) groups with a
less extensive alternate channel than was available to the plaintiffs in
Taxation with Representation. At the same time, 501(c)(4) groups are
themselves permitted to create affiliated section 527 political organizations. A 501(c)(3) group is thus permitted to have a sister
501(c)(4) organization that can engage in some campaign activity itself and can have an affiliated 527 organization devoted exclusively to
166
participation in campaigns.
Is this Rube Goldberg arrangement
likely to satisfy the constitutional requirements of the alternate channel test? More than one commentator has argued that requiring a
church to speak through layers of affiliated organizations robs the institution of the ability to express its views itself, i.e., with a religious
167
voice.
168
No Supreme Court decision addresses this question directly.
The closest the Cammarano decision comes is the assertion, made by
Justice Douglas in his concurrence, that he would consider the denial
of a business deduction for lobbying expenses to be a penalty if Con164
165
166
167

168

See supra note 29.
See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (2006); see also supra note 30.
See 2002 CPE, supra note 34, at 477–78 (providing an example of how this process would
work).
See NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT:
PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 281 (2011) (noting that a 501(c)(4) “alternative may not be similarly availing for their religious messages”); Kemmitt, supra note 25, at
173 (arguing that requiring a church to communicate through a different entity would
mean that “the church would be stripped of its religious voice”). Kemmitt mistakenly believes that only the church-related PAC, and not the church-related 501(c)(4), can engage in campaign activity. See id. at 161. Thus, the speaker is not as far removed from the
church as Kemmitt believes and, under TWR, the 501(c)(3) organization must be able to
control the 501(c)(4)’s speech. Nonetheless, as Kemmitt observes, clergy members cannot endorse candidates from the pulpit nor otherwise support specific candidates in their
capacity as head of the church. Id. at 173. See also CRIMM & WINER, supra, at 4–8 (speaking through a 501(c)(4) organization might deprive a house of worship of its ability to
convey a political message as a religious entity).
Precisely this issue was under review in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, however, and the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the political prohibition
was constitutional, inter alia, because the plaintiff could establish a 501(c)(4) group that
could set up an affiliated PAC. 211 F.3d 137, 143–44 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The Court of Appeals reached this holding even though it assumed, wrongly, that 501(c)(4) groups were
themselves barred from campaign activity. Id. at 143.
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gress were to deny a taxpayer that lobbies all business deductions,
169
and not just a deduction for lobbying expenses. For the majority in
that case, the taxpayers’ speech rights were not burdened merely be170
cause they had to pay for lobbying “out of their own pockets.” The
majority opinion in Taxation with Representation struck the same note
as Justice Douglas, observing that TWR was not being denied a cha171
ritable contribution deduction for its non-lobbying activities.
Although it noted that there was some burden involved in setting up a
172
501(c)(4) group, the Court concluded nonetheless that Congress
had not “infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated any First
173
Amendment activity.”
These two cases thus suggest that the Supreme Court should be
quite deferential to Congress when assessing the threshold issue, i.e.,
whether speech has been burdened as a matter of constitutional law.
They imply that an organization’s speech rights would be infringed
only if it were prevented from engaging in First Amendment activity
absolutely as a condition of receiving the tax exemption to which it was
174
otherwise entitled.
However, as noted above, the Taxation with Representation decision has been interpreted by later cases to say that the
taxpayer’s speech rights would be infringed if there were no alternate
175
channel for the exercise of those rights.
Cammarano and Taxation
with Representation (as interpreted by later cases) thus may advance
different accounts of what constitutes a burden on political speech.
Further, Taxation with Representation’s less deferential approach sheds
little light on the type of affiliation that will satisfy the alternate channel test beyond its assertion that the exempt organization must be
able to control the content of the affiliated organization’s lobbying
speech.
By themselves, then, these cases do not definitively answer the
“Rube Goldberg” question. A recent decision of the Roberts Court
suggests—although it does not guarantee—that the Supreme Court
will not find the current campaign prohibition for 501(c)(3) organizations an infringement on the organizations’ free speech. Ysursa v.
Pocatello Education Association involved a challenge to an Idaho law
169
170
171
172
173
174

175

Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 513.
461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983).
Id. at 544 n.6.
Id. at 546.
See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 395 (1984) (finding a regulation overbroad where it includes private broadcasters that do not take a partisan stand in its prohibition).
See supra notes 154–158 and the accompanying text.
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prohibiting any public employer (state or local) from providing a
payroll deduction to facilitate their employees’ ability to make pay176
The District Court concluded that
ments to their union’s PAC.
Idaho’s refusal to provide a payroll deduction for political contributions for state employees was not an abridgement of the unions’
speech because Idaho was under no obligation to incur the cost of
177
such a program.
However, it pronounced the State’s ban on local
governments providing such a payroll deduction unconstitutional be178
cause no state subsidy was involved at the local level. Only the latter
part of the ruling was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
179
upheld the decision of the lower court.
The Supreme Court reversed. Although the constitutionality of
the prohibition as it affected the state government was no longer being challenged, the Court nonetheless reviewed the issue and repeated the lower court’s reasoning that Idaho was under no obligation to “enhance” unions’ political speech nor “aid” them “in their
180
political activities” by means of a payroll deduction.
The Court
supplemented the lower court’s reasoning by noting that Idaho had
an “interest in avoiding the reality or appearance of government fa181
voritism or entanglement with partisan politics.”
The Court then
used the latter rationale to justify the State’s ban on local governments providing a payroll deduction for contributions to a union
PAC, even though local government payroll deductions cost the state
nothing and, according to the unions, could not be considered a
182
“subsidy” by the State.
In Ysursa, the Supreme Court accepted as fact that “‘unions face
substantial difficulties in collecting funds for political speech without
183
using payroll deductions.’” Despite this finding, the Court asserted
that there was no infringement on the unions’ political speech and,
thus, that the Idaho law should be reviewed using the rational basis
184
test.
To support its position, the Court repeatedly cited Taxation
with Representation, which had also concluded that the economic burden caused by the restriction at issue was not of constitutional significance. The Court in the earlier case argued that
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184

See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1096 (2009).
Id. at 1097.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Id. at 1101.
Id. at 1098 (quoting Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007)).
Id.
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[a]lthough TWR does not have as much money as it wants, and thus cannot exercise its freedom of speech as much as it would like, the Constitution does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to
185
realize all the advantages of that freedom.

These two decisions involving free speech reach the same outcome as
the Supreme Court’s rulings in connection with the free exercise
prong of the First Amendment: an organization’s loss of revenue as a
result of revocation of its exemption “is not constitutionally signifi186
cant.”
The Supreme Court in Ysursa relied exclusively on the majority
187
opinion in Taxation with Representation, which, as was noted earlier,
appears more deferential to Congress than was Blackmun’s concurrence. Ysursa thus suggests that the Roberts Court may be as willing
as most previous Supreme Courts to find political speech unburdened as a constitutional matter when the effect of legislation denying an organization a tax-favored status is to place it in a more burdensome economic position.
The reasoning in Massachusetts Citizens for Life is consistent with
these precedents. The Supreme Court in that case invalidated a
campaign finance law that required a corporate 501(c)(4) group to
fund certain of its campaign activities by using an affiliated political
action committee (PAC), largely basing its conclusion on the administrative burden and related costs that the 501(c)(4) group would
188
thereby experience. Although on the surface the Court’s decision
may seem inconsistent with the alternate channel reasoning in Taxation with Representation, in point of fact the Court in Massachusetts Citizens for Life went out of its way to distinguish Taxation with Representation on the ground that the alternate channel procedure blessed in
the earlier case “would infringe no protected activity, for there is no
189
right to have speech subsidized by the Government.” Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, in contrast, involved a direct restriction on the campaign activity of a nonprofit under the campaign finance regime.

185
186

187
188
189

Regan v. Taxation with Representation (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391–92 (1990); see also
Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (2000) (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries
and Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (1989) to justify upholding the political
prohibition for 501(c)(3) organizations); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 700
(1989) (pointing out that any other rule would impede the operation of the tax system) .
Supra note 158.
FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 241–42, 264–65 (1986).
Id. at 256 n.9.
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At least two appellate courts have issued similar rulings. In American Society for Association Executives v. United States, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia said that the rational relation
test should be applied to section 162(e)’s denial of business deductions for lobbying expenses, despite the provision’s potential economic impact on 501(c)(6) organizations and their members, because they were free to avoid the problems complained of by setting
up two 501(c)(6) organizations, one of which would not lobby at
190
all. Citing Taxation with Representation, the court continued, “If this
option is available, the treatment of lobbying contested here is subject only to ‘rational basis’ scrutiny, and, as we shall see, handily sur191
vives.”
Similarly, in Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality
192
of a disclosure provision for section 527 political organizations. Relying on Taxation with Representation, the Eleventh Circuit said that,
“[t]he fact that the organization might then engage in somewhat less
speech because of stricter financial constraints does not create a con193
stitutionally-mandated right to the tax subsidy.”
Based upon the reasoning in the preceding Supreme Court and
appellate court decisions, the current tax law prohibition on
501(c)(3) groups participating in political campaigns is likely to be
understood as creating a potential economic burden on the groups’
election-related speech that nonetheless does not create a corresponding constitutional burden.
The prohibition against campaign activity by charities might still
be unconstitutional if it were seen as involving content discrimination
by virtue of targeting “political” speech. A challenge of this kind is
unlikely to succeed, however. In Cammarano, the Supreme Court rejected the charge that the denial of a business deduction for the cost
of lobbying was content based because it targeted lobbying, asserting
instead that the provision in question was a “[n]ondiscriminatory
denial of [a] deduction” that was clearly not part of an attempt to
194
suppress specific ideas.
The Ysursa Court similarly rejected the
claim that the Idaho statute prohibiting payroll deductions for con190
191
192
193

194

195 F.3d 47, 50–51 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See infra note 223 and accompanying text (describing the operation of section 162(e)).
Id. at 50.
353 F.3d 1357, 1362 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1361. The court also said that it was following TWR, in which the Supreme Court
“analyzed the [unconstitutional] condition within the context of the overall tax scheme,
rather than as a separate provision or penalty” in response to TWR’s claim that the lobbying restriction was an unconstitutional condition. Id.
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
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tributions to union PACs was content-based because of its impact on
195
political speech.
In sum, the threshold inquiry into the existence of a burden resulting from the tax law’s political prohibition is likely to conclude
that no such burden exists because 501(c)(3) groups have a significant alternate channel for their campaign activities, economic burdens do not necessarily constitute legal burdens as a matter of constitutional law, and restrictions affecting the entire category of
campaign speech are not considered content discrimination.
B. The Political Campaign Prohibition Scrutinized
Based upon the preceding, the tax law political campaign prohibition should be reviewed using the rational relation test. This test is
satisfied if government action is directed toward a legitimate government interest and the means chosen is rationally related to that
196
goal.
The Congressional reports in 1954 are silent as to the reason the
political prohibition was added to the Code. Nonetheless, the intent
of Congress can be gleaned from the concerns that led Congress to
hold hearings on the subject of charities’ advocacy activities in the
preceding decade. A limitation on campaign activity by charities had
been proposed in Congress in 1934, but not enacted. Prior to 1954,
the IRS had sometimes taken the position that political activity
should not be subsidized through the Code, and there were a few
197
judicial decisions supporting that position. These precedents reveal
a general policy against permitting tax benefits to subsidize campaign
spending indirectly as well as concern about charities funding campaign activity with deductible contributions. To the extent that
avoiding political campaigns subsidized through the tax code is the
goal of the political prohibition for 501(c)(3) groups, the means cho195

196
197

See Ysura v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1099 (2009) (“Idaho does not suppress
political speech but simply declines to promote it through public employer checkoffs for
political activities.”); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991) (rejecting plaintiffs’ allegation of content-based regulation of speech because of the federal government’s refusal to allow Title X funds to be used for abortion counseling or even counseling that mentioned abortion). The dissent disagreed with the majority on this point, see
id. at 209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and it is difficult to imagine what would be contentbased regulation if the regulation in Rust does not qualify.
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR), 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983)
(explaining the “rational basis” standard applied to statutory classifications).
See the history described in Murphy, supra note 26, Colinvaux, supra note 26, and William
P. Streng, The Federal Tax Treatment of Political Contributions and Political Organizations, 29
TAX LAWYER 139, 142–43 (1976).
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198

sen are reasonably related to the end. The prohibition may not be
the least restrictive means of achieving that objective, since it does
more than prevent charitable contributions from being used to sup199
port campaign activities. In particular, as some have suggested, requiring 501(c)(3) groups to set up a separate segregated account
funded only with sums raised for which the contribution deduction
was not claimed would enable such groups to participate in campaigns without dollars benefiting from the contribution subsidy. Because of this, Professor Benjamin Leff has recently argued that the
501(c)(3) political prohibition could be unconstitutional “to the degree it goes beyond advancing a concern with expenditure equi200
ty . . . .” However, Leff also cautions that a mechanism used to allocate the cost of campaign activity to an affiliated entity would have to
take into account hidden costs, such as some portion of the expense
of developing and maintaining the 501(c)(3) group’s credibility, in
201
order to be completely accurate. This type of sophisticated analysis
is not, however, necessary because the rational basis test does not require the government to employ the least restrictive means to achieve
its goal.
A second possible rationale, one advanced by the Ysursa Court, is
the government’s interest in not supporting or becoming entangled
202
with partisan activities. This rationale does not seem applicable in
relation to exempt organizations, however, because the Code prohibits political intervention only in connection with 501(c)(3) groups,
whereas other organizations exempt under 501(a) are not included
203
in the ban.
In addition, Congress enacted section 527 to provide
exempt status for the income of organizations created to influence
electoral campaigns and to favor donors to such organizations by re204
moving their gift taxation exposure for large contributions.
Thus,

198

199
200

201
202
203
204

The fact that certain veterans’ groups can engage in political campaigns, yet receive deductible contributions, does not undermine the rationality of the decision to prevent
charities from intervening in campaigns. The government is free to provide tax subsidies
selectively to achieve purposes it deems beneficial. See supra notes 87, 93.
See infra notes 200–201, 207, and accompanying text.
Benjamin M. Leff, “Sit Down and Count the Cost”: A Framework for Constitutionally Enforcing
the 501(c)(3) Campaign Intervention Ban, 28 VA. TAX REV. 673, 686 (2009); see also Chris
Kemmitt, supra note 25 (arguing that under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), churches should be permitted to engage in political campaign activity as long as
they do not use contributions tax deductible under section 170 of the Code).
See Leff, supra note 200, at 708–14.
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 527 (2006).
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existing tax law does not seem to reveal concern with governmental
neutrality toward campaign activity.
It is possible to distinguish the cases in which Congress allows exempt status for groups engaged in campaigns on the grounds that the
groups are not entitled to receive deductible contributions, as are
205
501(c)(3) organizations subject to the political prohibition.
However, this would be a quantitative distinction at most, which fits better
with a subsidy rather than an entanglement rationale for the political
prohibition. An entangled argument might, however, be based upon
the observation, made by Professor Johnny Rex Buckles, that because
the charitable contribution deduction favors more affluent taxpayers,
permitting charities to engage in campaigns would result in the tax
code favoring the electoral preferences of the more affluent over
206
those of the less affluent, as well.
The legislative history of section 527 political organizations, which
specifically denies 501(c)(3) groups the ability to establish a 527
207
group, suggests another possible rationale underlying the prohibition. Congress could easily have authorized 501(c)(3) groups to establish affiliated 527 groups subject to restrictions precluding the
former groups from funding the latter groups with funds derived
from deductible contributions, but it chose not to. This suggests that
preventing political activities from being funded with deductible contributions was not the exclusive rationale for preventing 501(c)(3)
groups from political intervention. The twin prohibitions against
campaign intervention and establishment of a 527 group may also reflect a belief that charitable exemption and partisan politics are incompatible.
This last explanation is consistent with the fact that the rationale
for exempting 501(c)(3) groups from federal income tax and for allowing contributors to them a charitable contribution deduction in
the first place is to encourage the existence and viability of associations dedicated to particular public purposes enumerated in the
208
Code and elaborated in the Treasury regulations.
Section 501 of

205

206
207
208



See Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even A Peep: The Regulation of Campaign Activity by Charities
through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1081 (2007) (noting that “the electoral
politics of charities favored by the rich would likely receive a disproportionately large subsidy were the prohibition of electioneering repealed”).
See id. (noting that the progressive income tax rates result in a greater subsidy of high income earners than of lower income ones).
See supra note 161.
See supra notes 146–47 and the accompanying text; see also Tiffany Keb, Comment, Redefining What it Means to be Charitable: Raising the Bar with a Public Benefit Requirement, 86 OR. L.
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the Code is not simply a federal version of state nonprofit laws, which
permit entities to organize as nonprofit organizations as long as they
are not established for a pecuniary purpose and do not distribute
their revenues to private persons (other than a permitted class of beneficiaries). Rather, section 501(c) targets specific categories of public purpose that lawmakers have determined should be encouraged
through a system of tax exemption and, in some instances, charitable
209
contribution deduction. This would appear to be precisely the type
of project selection that the Supreme Court has validated in the past
210
in public funding cases.
The prohibition against political intervention also can be justified
as a corollary of the meaning of public purpose, i.e., that pursuit of a
public purpose is not consistent with involvement in political campaigns on a partisan basis. The Service’s interpretation of the political prohibition does not bar 501(c)(3) organizations from campaign
activity absolutely; rather it permits campaign activity that is nonpartisan, such as voter mobilization not favoring a specific political party
or candidate. Nor, as discussed above, does it prohibit other election

209

210

REV. 865, 866 (2007) (arguing that charities should have to demonstrate their public
benefit to be entitled to exemption).
It is possible to view section 501(c)(4) as describing any nonprofit organization with a
public purpose that does not fit into another subsection of section 501(c). See JAMES J.
FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 990
(3d ed. 2006) (asserting that “[a]s a practical matter . . . § 501(c)(4) has become the default choice (‘dumping ground’?) for organizations that fail to make the grade” as charities). While it is true that the meaning of “social welfare” in section 501(c)(4) is broad,
not every nonprofit group that seeks 501(c)(4) status succeeds. See, e.g., Contracting
Plumbers Co-op. Restoration Corp. v. United States, 488 F.2d 684, 685–87 (2d Cir. 1973)
(finding that a non-profit organization is not exempt even though its activities are “commendable” because it “provides substantial and different benefits to both the public and
its private members . . . .”); Rev. Rul. 77–273, 1977–2 C.B. 195 (stating that nonprofit organizations that provide security services do not qualify for exemption); Rev. Rul. 61–158,
1961–2 C.B. 115–16 (holding that a charitable organization that funds its operations by
holding a weekly lottery is not entitled to an exemption); see also John Francis Reilly,
Carter C. Hull, & Barbara A. Braig Allen, IRC 501(c)(4) Organizations, in IRS, EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
PROGRAM FOR FY 2003, at I–1, I–9 to I–12 (2002); Miriam Galston, Vision Service Plan v.
U.S.: Implications for Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4)s, 53 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 165, 166–
67 (2006) (discussing prior cases finding certain 501(c) organizations non-exempt because one of their non-exempt activities were substantial in nature).
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193–95 (1991) (noting that “[t]he Government can,
without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities is believed to be in the public interest . . . [and it may choose] to fund on activity to
the exclusion of the other.”); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 399–400 (1984);
see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547–48
(1963) (rejecting the organization’s equal protection challenge, stating that the substantial lobbying provision was part of Congress’s legitimate tax classification function).
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related activities that are conducted on a nonpartisan basis, such as
211
candidate forums and voter education materials. Clearly, some exempt organizations are convinced that they can further their exempt
purposes more effectively by supporting or opposing particular candidates for public office than without such actions, and they may be
correct in some instances. In rejecting this approach, the Service explained that “support of a candidate for public office necessarily involves the organization in the total political attitudes and positions of
the candidate,” in contrast to lobbying, which can be targeted to spe212
cific legislation of direct interest to an organization.
Thus, assuming the prohibition derives from the meaning of public purpose, the
means chosen by Congress is rationally related to its goals.
In short, as long as Congress’s decision not to commit public
funds to partisan methods of achieving public purposes bestows or
withholds exemption in a politically neutral fashion, it appears to be
subject to the rational relation test, whose minimal requirements it
satisfies without difficulty.
C. Overbreadth Analysis
A challenge could be made to the Code’s political campaign restrictions on the ground that, as interpreted by the Service, they are
overbroad because they cover First Amendment protected activities
213
that cannot be restricted constitutionally.
Specifically, litigation
currently in the lower courts asserts that the statute and regulations
are overbroad because they include in prohibited campaign activity
214
communications other than express advocacy.
As was explained
215
earlier, the Service defines the campaign prohibition broadly, to include communications and other activities that support or oppose
candidates for public office, and not just those expressly advocating
the election or defeat of such candidates.
The overbreadth doctrine operates primarily in situations involv216
ing First Amendment protections. One of the main purposes of the

211
212
213
214
215
216

See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233, 1969 GCM Lexis 12, at *8 (Dec. 30, 1969).
See Complaint, Christian Coal., supra note 17, at ¶¶ 72–77; Complaint, Catholic Answers,
supra note 17, at ¶¶ 38–43.
See Complaint, Christian Coal., supra note 17, at ¶¶ 76–77; Complaint, Catholic Answers,
supra note 17, at ¶¶ 42–43.
See Part I.A.
See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118 (2003); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense
of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 859–62 (1991) (describing the other situations in which
the doctrine can be applied).
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doctrine is to permit facial challenges to legislation or other government actions that may chill the proper exercise of protected rights
because the government has framed what is prohibited more broadly
217
than necessary to achieve its objectives. As formulated by the Court
in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, which upheld a statute limiting state employees’ ability to engage in partisan campaign activity against a facial
challenge, the question is whether the overbreadth is “substan218
tial . . . judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”
Thus, the Court in Broadrick upheld a statute with provisions prohibiting state employees from engaging in specific acts of political participation that were likely to be invalidated if challenged separately, on
an as applied basis, because the vast majority of the statute’s provi219
sions were constitutional.
An overbreadth challenge can succeed,
then, only if it can be shown that the Code’s prohibition against political intervention applies to a substantial amount of communications
or other conduct that 501(c)(3) groups should be permitted to engage in under the First Amendment. The answer to an overbreadth
challenge thus presupposes an answer to the prior, substantive question of the appropriate reach of the Code’s political restrictions.
Because most precedents in this area involve a challenge to direct
regulation of protected activity, the government’s action is typically
analyzed using strict scrutiny and, thus, its action must reflect a compelling state interest and be the least restrictive means of accomplish220
221
ing its goal. However, as was discussed in the previous sections, if
217

218

219
220

See Fallon, supra note 216, at 868 n. 94 (suggesting that the overbreadth doctrine is prophylatic, in that the Supreme Court has “discretion to adjust the doctrine’s contours in
light of their assessment of the doctrine’s practical effects”). The chill potentially resulting from overbreadth is thus different from the potential chill resulting from vagueness,
since the latter is a consequence of an actor’s uncertainty as to whether conduct is covered
by the statute, whereas the former is a product of the statute’s excessive scope. But see id.
at 904 (arguing that vagueness doctrine “is best conceptualized as a subpart of First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine”). For the “analytical link” uniting vagueness and
overbreadth analysis, see Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558, 585 (1994) (citing
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358–59 (1983); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1033–35 (2d ed. 1988)).
413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); see also Hicks, 539 U.S. at 118–19 (quoting and applying this
language). The Court has so far failed to explain what it means by “substantial” in the
context of overbreadth. See Richard Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1773, 1783 (2001). Hasen argues that the Court should ascertain
overbreadth empirically, rather than through speculation. Id. at 1782–90.
See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 618.
See id. at 611–12 (articulating the strict scrutiny standard applied to First Amendment cases); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 12677, 1278–79 (2007)
(describing the emergence of the strict scrutiny standard in free speech cases); id. at 1313
(describing the uneven application of strict scrutiny in free speech cases).
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it employs traditional tax law constitutional doctrines, the Court
should be deferential to Congress’s judgment regarding the state interest at stake, i.e., which types of public purposes it wants to encourage through the tax code, including whether or to what extent it sees
such purposes as inconsistent with partisan preoccupations. The
claim that the Code’s restrictions are overbroad because they extend
to more than express advocacy can thus be seen as a back door attempt to import into tax law jurisprudence campaign finance First
Amendment standards for what political speech can be regulated
without first demonstrating the necessity of applying those standards
to Congress’s tax classifications on the merits.
The failure to demonstrate the threshold question of the legitimacy of Congress designing tax exemption categories to limit or exclude partisan activity is likely to be fatal to an overbreadth challenge
to the Code’s campaign restrictions because the Supreme Court generally places the burden of demonstrating substantial overbreadth on
222
the one who challenges a provision as overbroad. Another obstacle
to limiting the tax law standard to express advocacy is that, if successful, this interpretation could require the Supreme Court to invalidate
other sections of the Code of long standing. To take the most obvious example, section 162(e) prohibits a business deduction for the
cost of lobbying or “participation in, or intervention in, any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office,” even if the cost otherwise qualifies as an ordinary and neces223
sary business expense. The political campaign language is virtually
224
identical to the counterpart language used in section 501(c)(3).
Thus, if campaigning is limited to express advocacy in section
501(c)(3), the unintended consequence might be to force the Ser-

221
222

223
224

See supra Part IV. A–B.
See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (citing Broadrick, 413
U.S. at 615). The sentence in Broadrick states that this is so “particularly where conduct
and not merely speech is involved . . . .” Subsequent cases have repeated the need for
substantial overbreadth before legislation is unconstitutionally overbroad without mentioning this qualification. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S.
Ct. 1184, 1190 n.6 (2008) (upholding a facial attack on a state’s election law provision as
violating state political parties’ associational rights); Hicks, 539 U.S. at 118–20 (2003) (insisting that a law be considered substantially broad before invalidating it as overbroad); see
also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772 (1982) (advancing the view that overbreadth
must be substantial in pure speech cases).
I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(B) (2006).
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (“[P]articipate in or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office.”).
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vice to permit business deductions for all campaigning except express
advocacy.
In sum, the burden of demonstrating that the Service’s current interpretation of campaign activity is overbroad will be on the challengers. To carry this burden, they must demonstrate, without bootstrapping from campaign finance jurisprudence, that Congress’s
power to define which endeavors are charitable and entitled to the
expenditure of limited public resources is constitutionally limited to
the narrow definition of campaign activity they favor.
D. Vagueness Analysis
There are, then, considerable obstacles to a successful overbreadth challenge to legislation. The prohibition against political
campaign activity could also be challenged as unconstitutionally vague because neither the statute nor the regulations elaborate with
precision the nature of the proscribed activity. The general standard
set forth in the statute and regulations is developed in a few judicial
decisions, numerous Revenue Rulings, private letter rulings, and assorted other administrative pronouncements. Letter rulings and similar administrative materials are not precedential guidance, which
might affect a First Amendment challenge based upon vagueness
225
since they cannot be cited in a judicial proceeding as precedent.
There is some authority that a court can consult such materials for an
226
indication of the Service’s interpretation of a tax provision and
even “accept the reasoning” as persuasive in the absence of authority
227
to the contrary. Nonetheless, the courts are agreed that taxpayers
are not entitled to have a court resolve a controversy based upon views
expressed by the Service to other taxpayers or contained in internal
228
administrative documents.
Efforts to determine whether legislation is unconstitutionally vague often begin with a general statement of the public policies served
by the vagueness standard. First and foremost is the due process con225
226

227
228

See I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 601.201(l)(6)(2010).
See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 328, 334 (2003) (“Private letter
rulings represent the IRS’s individual response to a particularized inquiry from a specific
taxpayer and, as such, have no precedential value. . . . This does not mean, of course, that
private letter rulings cannot be looked to as a source of guidance in understanding the
IRS’s interpretation of the tax laws.”) (citing Hannover Bank v. Comm’r, 369 U.S. 672,
686 (1962))).
See AT&T Corp. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 209, 213 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).
See Fla. Power & Light, 56 Fed. Cl. at 334 (“[P]laintiff cannot claim entitlement to a tax
treatment on the basis of a ruling issued to another taxpayer.”)
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cern that, absent sufficient specificity, government directives will fail
to afford adequate notice to those affected concerning conduct required or prohibited. Frequently cited in this connection is the warning of Connally v. General Construction Co., that a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague if “men of common intelligence must
229
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application . . . .”
The opinion rested on the observation that due process presupposes
that substantial fines and long terms of imprisonment may only be
imposed if the nature of the proscribed conduct has been conveyed
230
sufficiently to those potentially affected.
Equally important is the
231
concern that a vague statute lends itself to arbitrary enforcement.
Initially, most of the cases citing Connally, involved criminal sta232
tutes and/or loyalty oaths.
More recently, the Connally pronouncement has been cited in the context of civil laws challenged for
233
The standard is not, however, apbeing unconstitutionally vague.
plied identically in the two situations. In the view of the Supreme
Court, “where a statute imposes criminal penalties, the standard of
234
certainty is higher” than in other cases.
The Supreme Court also distinguishes the standard applicable to
vague economic regulations from those applicable to vagueness in restrictions limiting speech. The former can be evaluated using a “less
strict vagueness test,” whereas “a more stringent vagueness test” will
229

230
231

232
233
234

269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914)
(invalidating a criminal antitrust statute)); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914)
(invalidating a criminal statute prohibiting members of certain agricultural pools from
acting independently of the pool)); see also generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108–09 (1972) (discussing the various values that are implicated where a statute is
vague, including the lack of notice and reasonable opportunity to know what the law
prohibits).
Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (criticizing a criminal statute for failing to
provide an adequate standard for the statute’s requirements, thereby vesting almost complete discretion with the police); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, 368
U.S. 278, 283–85 (1961) (invalidating a loyalty oath that was punishable by dismissal from
public employment and conviction for perjury on the grounds that it was “so vague as to
deprive [someone] . . . of liberty or property without due process . . . .”); Grayned, 408
U.S. at 108–09 (“[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws
must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.”).
See, e.g., supra note 229; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 515 (1958) (involving a loyalty
oath).
See, e.g., Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (involving Treas. Reg. § 1.1501–1(d)(3)).
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358–59 n.8 (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948)); see
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) (observing that vagueness in a “criminal statute or regulatory scheme” could raise concerns not present when
selecting recipients for publicly funded (NEA) grants).
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235

be applied to the latter. Finally, as noted earlier, content-based re236
strictions are subject to the most rigorous scrutiny, and vagueness in
content-based regulations similarly “raises special First Amendment
concerns because of” the danger that it will chill the targeted
237
speech.
It is unclear how these authorities would be applied in tax cases
involving First Amendment issues and what level of scrutiny would be
employed in analyzing the political campaign prohibition employing
a vagueness test. Taxation with Representation is not useful here, since
the plaintiff association did “not challenge the proscription against
238
‘substantial lobbying’ on grounds of vagueness . . . .”
In National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, a public funding case decided in 1998,
the Supreme Court upheld statutory criteria that had been chal239
lenged as both discriminatory and vague. In its decision, the Court
distinguished the level of scrutiny required for criminal statutes and
statutes that directly regulate conduct, on the one hand, and statutes
240
involving subsidies, on the other.
It held that “when the Government is acting as a patron rather than a sovereign,” a level of imprecision is permitted that would be constitutionally unacceptable in other
241
contexts.
The campaign prohibition in the Code is clearly not a criminal
statute since the sanctions for violating it range from a warning let242
243
ter or the imposition of an excise tax to revocation of tax exemp244
tion. Although tax statutes are not necessarily regulatory statutes, it
would seem that the campaign prohibition could be characterized as
235
236
237
238
239
240

241
242

243
244

Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982).
See supra note 123.
Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997).
See Taxation with Representation of Washington v. Regan (TWR), 676 F.2d 715, 726 n.22
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
See 524 U.S. at 588–89 (upholding admittedly vague and subjective standards for selecting
recipients for NEA awards).
See id. at 588. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States notes that the “power to tax the exercise
of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment.” 631 F.2d 1030, 1034
(D.C. Cir. 1980). That general proposition, enunciated in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 112 (1943), has since been circumscribed in its application.
See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 589.
See IRS, PROJECT 302: POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (“PACI”) (2006).
The Service found that, of the cases it closed, sixty-eight percent of the charities investigated had in fact violated the political prohibition. Almost all these groups were issued
“written advisories.” Id. at 18. At the time the Report was issued, twenty-four percent of
the examinations were still in progress. Id. at 12.
See I.R.C. § 4955 (1987).
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)–1(1987), Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(f)(2)(ii) (2008). However, as noted by Greg Colvin, criminal sanctions can result from a finding of perjury resulting from an organization’s inaccurate Form 990.
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regulatory since its purpose is to control conduct rather than to raise
revenue. Alternatively, the prohibition can be seen as incidental to
the statute’s primary purpose of defining what is “charitable” by ex245
cluding activities that are private and partisan in nature.
So interpreted, the prohibition is less regulatory than classificatory, and the
classification serves the government’s interest in selecting as charities
those nonprofits most worthy of public encouragement with public
resources. The classification of the political prohibition as regulatory
or not might well determine whether the challenge to it on vagueness
grounds would be tested under a deferential rational basis standard
or a form of heightened scrutiny.
One of the most careful analyses of vagueness in a section
246
501(c)(3) context occurs in Big Mama Rag v. United States.
The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit characterized
247
the standard to be applied in First Amendment cases as “strict,” and
it concluded that the definition of “educational” in the Treasury regulations was unconstitutionally vague and prone to selective en248
forcement.
The court found that the regulations’ “full and fair”
standard was not only too general to be informative; it noted as well
that the regulations’ reliance on “the reactions of members of the
public” insured that the test would employ a “necessarily varying and
249
unascertainable standard.”
Moreover, the applicable regulations
were so confusing that it was unclear to the court whether the organization in question should have been subjected to the standard in the
250
251
first place.
The standard thus invited “subjective definitions.”
And in fact, the court observed, these ambiguities had enabled the
Service to apply the “full and fair” test to “only a very few organiza252
tions, whose views are not in the mainstream of political thought.”
In particular, the IRS appeared to have previously inappropriately
applied the full and fair test when assessing the status of a homosex253
ual organization, and the association involved in Big Mama Rag cha254
racterized itself as feminist and lesbian.
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254

See supra Part III. B.
631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1037.
Id.
Id. at 1036–37.
Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1036–37.
Id. at 1037; see also id. at 1040 (referring to the lower court’s “value laden conclusion that
Big Mama Rag was too doctrinaire”).
Id. at 1032; Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 473, 475 (1979).
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It seems, then, that the sub-text of the vagueness discussion in Big
Mama Rag was the court’s concern that the Service was using the regulations’ malleable standards to suppress certain kinds of ideas it
255
found distasteful or contrary to prevailing public norms. This possibility is reinforced by the fact that, in developing its view of the strict
standard to be applied to vagueness challenges in the First Amendment area, the Big Mama Rag court relied on precedents involving
256
content discrimination and the suppression of viewpoints. That the
Big Mama Rag outcome was driven by the court’s response to the Service’s practice of disfavoring views with which it did not agree substantively was also the interpretation of Big Mama Rag adopted by the
Tax Court in a subsequent case, which upheld the constitutionality of
257
Revenue Procedure 86-43, the ruling promulgated by the Service to
supplement the definition of “education” in its regulations after they
258
were declared unconstitutionally vague in Big Mama Rag.
Clearly, on its face, the political campaign prohibition is not designed to suppress specific viewpoints, since it is not targeted to any
political party or political orientation. However, it is possible that the
standard is not precise enough to afford constitutionally sufficient
notice to taxpayers attempting to comply with its strictures, nor to
prevent arbitrary, viewpoint based enforcement. As for the latter,
opinions are likely to differ as to the existence of political bias on the
part of the IRS when it actually enforces the political prohibition.
Complaints alleging biased enforcement have, in fact, been leveled
259
against the agency.
Responding to such complaints, the Treasury

255

256
257
258

259



Of course, it is constitutional to deny 501(c)(3) exemption to a group that violates a
strong public policy. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 579 & 605 (1983)
(upholding the Service’s denial of a charitable exemption to an institution of higher
learning that discriminated in admissions on the basis of race). The IRS did not, however, assert a violation of public policy against Big Mama Rag.
See Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d at 1034–35.
1986–2 C.B. 729 (1986).
See Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558, 581–83 (1994). Rev. Proc. 86–43 was
before the District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit in National Alliance v. United
States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The court in that case declined to rule directly on
the constitutionality of the Revenue Procedure, but it did note (in dictum) that the fourpart test went a long way toward “reduc[ing]” the vagueness in the “full and fair” test. Id.
at 875.
See, e.g., Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19 (D.D.C. 1999) (“Plaintiffs
also contend that the IRS selectively prosecuted the Church on the basis of its political
and/or religious views in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and that the revocation
violated the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.”); Tobin, supra note 153, at 1315–16 (stating that non-profits have criticized the IRS for subjective or
political enforcement practices); Art Pine, Inquiry Finds No IRS Wrongdoing in Audits, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2000, at A16 (describing a report that showed that claims by Republicans
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Inspector General of Tax Administration (TIGTA) conducted an in260
In
vestigation and gave the Service a clean bill of health in 2005.
addition, since 2004, the IRS has established and follows a national,
standardized procedure for identifying and reviewing possible violations of the political prohibition in each election cycle. This procedure is known as the “Political Activities Compliance Initiative,” or
261
“PACI.”
The method employed, which is published on the IRS
website, involves a specially trained team of personnel that reviews all
referrals alleging a violation of the political prohibition, decides
which cases should be investigated, forwards them to designated
agents in the field for investigation, and recommends sanctions when
262
violations are found. Although these procedures do not guarantee
lack of bias, the process should reduce the opportunity for viewpoint
discrimination significantly because it is well documented and the
method, results, and sanctions are described in detail on the Service’s
263
website.
Although several of the IRS’s determinations have been
264
contested by the organizations audited, published accounts of these
cases suggest that there is not a substantial risk of selective or discriminatory enforcement.
Whether the degree of notice of prohibited activities to affected
parties is constitutionally sufficient is more difficult to assess. The notice provided to organizations and guidance available to enforcement

260

261

262

263

264

that the Clinton Administration was using the IRS to persecute political opponents were
without merit).
See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, REVIEW OF THE EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS FUNCTION PROCESS FOR REVIEWING ALLEGED POLITICAL CAMPAIGN
INTERVENTION BY TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2005); see also Pine, supra note 259 (describing a report that cleared such allegations).
See IRS, PROJECT 302: POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (2006) (hereinafter
“2004 PACI Report”), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/final_paci_report.pdf
(discussing the method used to identify, review, and, where appropriate, sanction
501(c)(3) groups possibly engaging in prohibited activity in the 2004 election); IRS, 2006
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (2007) (hereinafter “2006 PACI Report”).
The PACI review for the 2008 election cycle is still in progress. For the reports issued in
connection with the 2004 and 2006 election cycles and materials related to the 2008 review, see Political Activity Compliance Initiative (2006 Election), IRS, http://www.irs.gov/
charities/charitable/article/0,,id=179738,00.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2011); see also infra note 263.
See, IRS, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE: PROCEDURES FOR 501(C)(3)
ORGANIZATIONS, 1–3 (2006) available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/paci_
procedures_feb_22_2006.pdf.; FINAL REPORT, PROJECT 302, supra note 261.
See Political Campaign Intervention by 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Organizations—Securing Compliance, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,,id=154622,00.html (last updated
June 14, 2010).
The most difficult situations involve speeches, sermons, and other communications that
contain multiple messages, some electoral and some not, in a single communication.
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personnel in connection with the political prohibition is far greater
than was provided under the full and fair standard at issue in Big
Mama Rag in at least two respects. First, the difference between the
regulations in the two situations is especially clear with respect to the
extent of vagueness. In Big Mama Rag, it was not even obvious to the
court which organizations were subject to the “full and fair” test to
begin with, and there was no written guidance elaborating the meaning of “full and fair” once the IRS determined that the standard
265
should be applied. In contrast, there is no ambiguity regarding the
entities subject to the political prohibition. Although there are a li266
mited number of judicial decisions applying the prohibition, there
are a dozen Revenue Rulings addressing the meaning of the political
prohibition, many of which describe and analyze multiple fact pat267
terns. The information contained in these sources has been reproduced in plain language guides in a wide assortment of publications,
such as pamphlets, brochures, and memoranda produced by law
firms and advocacy organizations, many of which are available for
268
free on the Internet.
That the amount of guidance explaining the political prohibition
is “significant” does not mean it is optimal. Optimal would be detailed regulations, replete with illustrations, as exist to determine
what constitutes lobbying when a section 501(h) election is in ef269
fect. At the same time, the fact that creative minds can devise campaign practices not addressed by existing guidance should not con270
demn that guidance as unconstitutionally vague.
Given the

265
266
267
268

269
270

See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1036–37 (1980) (discussing “[t]he
uncertainty of the coverage of the ‘full and fairness exposition’ standard . . . .”).
See supra note 31.
See supra notes 31; Kindell & Reilly, supra note 34 (discussing revenue rulings).
Some illustrative examples are a series of advisories produced by the Alliance for Justice
(AJF), located in Washington, D.C. and are available at: About Advocacy: Election Activity,
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE (July 18, 2007), http://www.afj.org/for-nonprofitsfoundations/resources-and-publications/about-advocacy-election.html; Resource Center:
IRS Rules on Election Activities of Charities, OMB WATCH (Jan. 29, 2009),
http://www.ombwatch.org/node/9627; James Bopp, Jr., Guidelines for Political Activities by
Churches
and
Pastors,
MINN.
CITIZENS
CONCERNED
FOR
LIFE,
http://www.mccl.org/%20Document.Doc?id=177 (last visited Mar. 27, 2011); James
Bopp, Jr., Guidelines for Political Activities of Right to Life Organizations, PA. PRO-LIFE FED’N,
(May 2008), http://www.paprolife.org/2008 Guidelines for Right to Life Organizations.pdf.
See Treas. Reg. §§ 56.4911–1–§ 56.4911–7 (2009).
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 n.15 (1972) (“It will always be true that
the fertile legal imagination can conjure up hypothetical cases in which the meaning of
disputed terms will be in nice question.”) (citing Am. Commc’ns Ass’n. v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 412 (1950) (internal quotations omitted)).
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complexity and variety of methods of political campaigning, not to
mention the rapidity with which campaigning has evolved with
changes in technology, this may be a situation in which the constitutional protection afforded speech must take into account “whether it
271
would have been practical to draft more precisely.”
In sum, although the prohibition is enforced through a facts and circumstances
test, there is a significant amount of precedential guidance to assist
both organizations that seek to stay on the right side of the line and
272
IRS personnel seeking to enforce the standard properly.
Second, as important as the quantity of guidance for interpreting
the political prohibition is the fact that the criteria contained in the
guidance are largely objective. For example, the Service’s determination depends upon such things as whether voting records are distributed on an annual basis at the close of legislative sessions or their
distribution is timed to an election, whether communications about
legislative issues are targeted to election periods and concentrated in
swing states where those issues are identified with specific candidates,
whether all candidates are invited to candidate forums, whether voter
guides based upon candidate surveys reproduce the candidates’
words accurately, whether partisan voter guides are distributed on the
organization’s premises or on the public sidewalks outside an organi273
zation’s control, and the like.
This contrasts with Big Mama Rag,
where the standard in the regulations required the IRS to determine
if a newsletter’s articles were “‘full and fair’” “based on an individualistic—and therefore necessarily varying and unascertainable—
274
standard: the reactions of members of the public.”
Some of the criteria contained in the political prohibition are,
however, subjective. For example, depending upon the context, the
IRS will examine whether the format or questions at a candidate forum reveal bias, whether the questions asked in a candidate survey
are too concentrated in a single subject area, suggesting bias, or
whether a communication made on the eve of an election improperly
conveys a view as to a candidate’s fitness for office. Considerations
such as these inject an element of uncertainty into the analysis that
may be troubling from a First Amendment perspective because, as a
271
272

273
274

Nationalist Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558, 588 (1994) (citing U.S. Civil Serv.
Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578–79 (1973)).
There is also considerable non-precedential guidance in the form of private letter rulings
issued to individual taxpayers, IRS Fact Sheets, Field Service advisories, PACI reports, and
Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional Education (CPE) Technical Instruction
Program essays used for training IRS personnel.
See supra notes 34–38, 60–65, and accompanying text.
Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1037 (1980).
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practical matter, they may impose a burden of restraint on would-be
actors during an election who desire to engage in political speech or
other election related activities. It is unclear whether the presence of
criteria requiring the exercise of judgment on the part of the organizations and the Service to this extent would trigger the application of
heightened scrutiny. For the reasons that follow, it is likely that the
level of indeterminacy posed by such criteria would survive heightened scrutiny, were it employed.
The fact that the political prohibition does not discriminate on
the basis of viewpoints and that the scope of the standard is not openended, as were the regulations implicated in Big Mama Rag, suggests
that the prohibition would be subject to intermediate scrutiny, if the
rational relation test is deemed too lenient for the vagueness threat
to political speech posed by the Code’s restrictions on campaign activity. That intermediate scrutiny would be used, rather than strict
scrutiny, if heightened scrutiny is employed, is also suggested by the
circumstance that most of the campaign finance cases employing
strict scrutiny involved criminal sanctions. For example, in invalidating the political expenditure cap in Buckley, the Supreme Court noted
that “[c]lose examination of the specificity of the statutory limitation
[on independent expenditures] is required where, as here, the legislation imposes criminal penalties in an area permeated by First
275
Amendment interests.” The Buckley Court characterized vagueness
276
in statutes with criminal sanctions as “particularly treacherous.”
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Wisconsin Right to Life was similarly
concerned that the penalty for violating the law was criminal prosecu277
tion and criminal penalties. Likewise, for the Citizens United majority, the “threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending
against FEC enforcement” facing corporations seeking to engage in
political activity during elections made the source rules in FECA ana278
logous to prior restraints on protected speech. Moreover, the campaign finance cases involved a complete ban on political speech, ac-

275

276
277

278

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40–41 (1976) (per curiam); see also id. at 40 n.47 (rejecting
the suggestion that to alleviate the vagueness of § 609(e)(1), the Commission should publish advisory opinions); supra note 234.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76.
See FEC v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc. (“WRTL”), 551 U.S. 449, 493 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the criminal nature of penalty); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
323, 335 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(noting the criminal penalties imposed on unions and corporations for broadcasting
messages that explicitly refer to a candidate).
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 895 (2010).
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279

cording to the Court, whereas 501(c)(3)organizations are able to
engage in political speech either as taxable entities or through exempt affiliates.
Violations of the political prohibition are not usually subject to
criminal sanctions. In the worst case, the IRS could impose revoca280
tion of an organization’s exemption and a civil tax penalty.
For a
501(c)(3) group, an excise tax of ten percent of the amount spent on
communication(s) determined to be campaign intervention could be
imposed on the organization, and a two and one half percent tax
could be imposed on the managers who made the decision, unless
281
their action was not willful and was due to reasonable cause. As the
IRS’s recent enforcement push reveals, however, revocation is rarely
proposed and it has only been imposed if violations are flagrant or
282
repeated.
As the PACI Reports also reveal, most organizations
found to have engaged in prohibited campaign activity have received
only written advisories, even though the violations included such
clearly prohibited activities as contributing money to a candidate or
283
posting campaign signs on the organization’s premises. Even when
excise taxes have been imposed, the Service frequently refunds the
tax as well as interest and penalties, if any, if the organization corrects
284
the violation. Further, revocation relating to one or more years of
279
280

281

282

283
284



See WRTL, 551 U.S. at 465.
As Greg Colvin has noted, an exempt organization runs the risk of a criminal violation if
its Form 990 is found to be fraudulent, but this would involve the intent to characterize its
activities falsely rather than filing a false return by mistake. Remarks at the Meeting of
the Committee on Exempt Organizations of the Section on Taxation of the American Bar
Association (May 7, 2010).
I.R.C. § 4955(a) (2006). Under existing interpretations of willfulness and reasonable
cause, it is unlikely that many decision makers would be subject to the manager’s tax. See
Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4955–1(b)(4)–(7) (describing the standard for “knowing,” “willfulness,”
and “reasonable cause”). For a description of the sanctions imposed on violations occurring in the last three election cycles, see the 2004 and 2006 PACI reports, supra note 261
and accompanying text. Note, however, that the amount of the excise taxes can be
doubled to one-hundred percent and fifty percent, for the organization and managers respectively, if the violation is not corrected. See I.R.C. § 4955(b) (2006). Correction
means “recovering part or all of the expenditure to the extent recovery is possible, establishment of safeguards to prevent future political expenditures, and where full recovery is
not possible, such additional corrective action as is prescribed by the Secretary by regulations.” I.R.C. 4955(f)(3) (2006).
See 2004 PACI Report and 2006 PACI Report, supra note 261; Branch Ministries, Inc. v.
Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (revoking the exemption of a church that
had placed a full-page advertisement in two national newspapers urging Christians not to
vote for Bill Clinton for President).
See 2004 Report and 2006 PACI Report, supra note 261, at 18.
See Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-cv-670-IEG (AJB), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 96070, at *7–8 (discussing IRS refund); Complaint, Christian Coal., supra note 17,
at ¶¶ 43–44 (mentioning IRS refund). Numerous commentators have remarked on the
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an organization in no way precludes it from having its exemption restored in exchange for agreeing to abstain from campaign activities.
All of these considerations bear on how chilled an organization’s
speech is likely to be as a result of the political prohibition. Although
civil fines can impose burdens on the affected entities, the burden is
qualitatively different from and usually far less extreme than what is
entailed by criminal sanctions.
Under the intermediate scrutiny standard of judicial scrutiny,
Congress would have to demonstrate that the purpose of the political
prohibition “furthers an important or substantial” interest, is “unrelated to the suppression of free expression,” and needs the prohibi285
tion for its goal to be implemented “effectively.” All of the interests
furthered by the political prohibition should be considered substantial: preventing deductible charitable contributions from being used
to fund political activities, assuring that only organizations devoted
exclusively to a charitable mission are selected to benefit from public
financial support, preventing tax favored charities from dissipating
their time, energy, and concentration on partisan activities, and preventing charities from engaging in activities with a high risk of furthering the private benefit of individuals and candidates for public
office.
The means chosen by Congress to address these concerns may be
more controversial. As was noted earlier, if preventing public funds
from subsidizing campaign activity is seen as the sole government interest, it may be possible to construct a mechanism involving an affi286
liated entity to reduce this risk.
Even so, it is difficult to predict
whether the political prohibition would be found constitutionally infirm for this reason, given that intermediate scrutiny does not require
the government to select the least restrictive means for achieving a
statute’s purpose. Further, taking into account considerations such
as keeping charities’ focus on their charitable mission and out of partisan activities, the ability of a 501(c)(3) organizations to partner with
affiliated 501(c)(4) groups that engage in campaign activity should
satisfy the standard of being narrowly drawn to achieve the entire
range of statutory purposes.

285
286

lax enforcement by the IRS. See, e.g., Keith S. Blair, Praying for a Tax Break: Churches, Political Speech, and the Loss of Section 501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 405, 428–
29 (2009) (discussing statistics suggesting that there is little IRS enforcement).
See supra notes 142–145 and accompanying text (discussing the intermediate scrutiny
standard).
See the suggestions made by CRIMM & WINER, supra note 167, at 326–27, 328–33; see also
supra notes 199–201.
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CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis is not entirely conclusive. A direct attack
on the constitutionality of the tax law prohibition on 501(c)(3)
groups’ political campaign activity is very unlikely to succeed, even
though the tax law restriction applies to a far wider range of campaign activities than is permitted for campaign finance regulation of
287
political speech. As discussed in this Part, the key differences in the
constitutional analysis of the prohibition under tax law, as compared
with the counterpart analysis of restrictions under campaign finance
law, suggest that minimal judicial scrutiny will be applied to the former and that both the government’s purpose in limiting political activity for charities and the means chosen will be found reasonable. In
part because of the weakness of an attack on the prohibition, an
overbreadth challenge is also likely to fail.
The outcome with respect to a vagueness challenge to the terms
of the prohibition, as implemented by the IRS, is more uncertain.
There is the possibility that intermediate scrutiny would be employed,
rather than the rational relation test, to evaluate the restriction. In
that event, it is likely that some, if not all, of the government interests
discussed in Part IV would be considered substantial. Some uncertainty exists as to the ability of the political prohibition to qualify as
narrowly enough drawn to achieve the government’s purposes. In
particular, the prohibition’s validity in this respect may turn on
whether a reviewing court accepts the validity of linking the prohibition to goals in addition to preventing deductible charitable contributions from financing campaign activity. Of course, if the Court
were to invalidate the political prohibition because it fails to provide
sufficient notice to the entities affected by the regulation or the government officials tasked with enforcing the regulations, the IRS
would be able to promulgate more detailed regulations, along the
model of the lobbying regulations for 501(c)(3) organizations, to
correct any deficiencies noted by the Court.
I would distinguish what I believe is a fair reading of the constitutional tax law jurisprudence from what might happen if the political
campaign prohibition makes its way to the Supreme Court. Five of
the current Justices have made crystal clear their aversion to anything
that can be construed as interfering with the free exercise of political
287

This Article has confined itself to the constitutional dimensions of the political prohibition. For a thorough analysis of the public policy reasons for the prohibition, focusing on
the dangers that would result were 501(c)(3) groups to engage in campaign activity, see
Tobin, supra note 153.
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speech. It is possible that they could disregard the weight of the precedents described in this paper, invoking other constitutional doctrines, for example, that the government should not be permitted to
do indirectly what it cannot do directly. They might argue that Massachusetts Citizens for Life has superseded Taxation with Representation
with respect to the constitutionality of requiring certain organizations
to use an affiliate for campaign activities and dismiss the distinction
between campaign finance and tax law expressly made by the Su288
preme Court in that case as mere dictum pronounced in a footnote.
In that event, the alternate channel doctrine blessed in Taxation with
Representation and subsequent Supreme Court cases would no longer
be good law and exempt organizations, like organizations in general,
could not have their political speech regulated to a greater degree
than is permitted by Buckley, as interpreted by Wisconsin Right to Life
and Citizens United.
The outcome, if campaign finance constitutional standards are
289
applied to tax legislation, is beyond the scope of this article. If the
political restrictions applying to charities and other exempt organizations are invalidated, it is likely that the tax code’s prohibition against
business deductions for the costs of campaigning and lobbying could
be found unconstitutional as well, since both the restrictions on business deductions and the limitations on lobbying by 501(c)(3) organizations were upheld using the identical rationale. As remote as these
possibilities may at first seem, given that three Justices are already on
290
record as prepared to overrule Buckley itself, it would be rash to
predict what the future will bring.
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See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 241–42, 256 n.9, 264–65 (1986).
Roger Colinvaux has recently engaged in such an analysis. He concluded that the tax law
political prohibition would be upheld even if scrutinized under campaign finance constitutional standards. Colinvaux, supra note 26, at 17–32.
See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 265–66 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that Buckley does not provide sufficient protection for First Amendment rights
with political speech); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 409–10 (2000)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the ruling of Buckley “ought to be eliminated”).

